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This project examines civic engagement. It is divided into three chapters: apathy, voting, and
group loyalties. I derive two duties, a duty to care and a duty to reason well, that serve as a
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INTRODUCTION

Deliberate actions are a better way to achieve good consequences than non-deliberate
ones in most circumstances. The abolitionist movement illustrates this point. Look at the life of
Sojourner Truth, a famous abolitionist and women’s rights advocate. She fought through
deliberate action the systems that she knew were wrong and was successful. Truth was the first
black woman to take a white man to court and gain a ruling in her favor. When she discovered
that her son had been illegally sold to the south, she prosecuted the man responsible for the sale
and won.1 She knew that by taking deliberate steps to challenge the oppressive systems
surrounding her, she could change people’s minds toward change and moral progress. Truth
devoted her life to touring around the country delivering speeches aimed at showing the
humanity of those that were still enslaved. She used her rise to prominence to shed light on
issues of human rights and to show people the fault in their ways. 2 Her deliberate actions brought
about more progress more rapidly than had been possible if she and other abolitionists had done
nothing. It is necessary to push people toward deliberate steps toward betting their society
because waiting for them to do it on their own may never result in anything.
The abolitionist movement shows the huge importance of deliberate action to reach good
consequences to improve the lives of significant parts of the population, but what about the case
where good consequences just happen on a small scale in our everyday lives? Think about
getting on to a crowded subway. You are waiting on the platform with only one other person as
your train arrives. The other person is an older woman who has some trouble standing for long
periods of time, you can tell because she leans heavily on the cane that she carries with her.
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When the train arrives, there is one open seat that one of you can take for the ride and whomever
gets on first is able to sit down. In the first scenario, you are reading a social media app on your
phone which causes your reaction to the arriving train to be delayed. By not paying attention to
when the doors on the subway car, you give the old lady enough time to get settled in the
remaining seat while you stand and hold the upper bar for the ride. In the second scenario, you
choose to allow the woman to go in front of you deliberately to get seated before the train starts
moving again.
In both of these scenarios it was your waiting longer on the platform that allowed the
elderly woman to get settled in the train first which was a good consequence because she cannot
stand for long periods of time and there was only one empty chair in the subway car that pulled
in front of you. The difference between the two scenarios is that you made a deliberate choice to
wait and allow the older woman to have the extra time to sit down. In the first, your delay was
due to a distraction on your phone, so you were not making a deliberate choice to allow her more
time. Now, you are still responsible for allowing the woman to have the seat since there were no
other people on the platform waiting for the train with you two. The difference is that if you were
to claim this responsibility for this, you would feel better claiming responsibility in the second
scenario than you would in the first. In the second scenario you feel better about your action and
responsibility for the outcome because you made the conscious choice to help.
The life of Sojourner Truth demonstrates that deliberate action aimed at moral progress
can have huge impacts on the quality of life for millions of people and that we should not wait to
strive toward these good consequences. We are responsible for ensuring that we help this type of
moral progress along. Everyday scenarios like the platform example indicate that deliberate
action is better than non-deliberate action that leads to good outcomes because claiming

responsibility for something feels better when you meant to do it in the first place. In both
examples I noted, deliberate action aimed at moral progress has better outcomes and carries less
moral risk than failing to take action at all. With that underlying assumption, I started thinking
about ways that I could integrate this into more aspects of everyday life. Thinking about a way to
live that is more likely to result in good consequences on a larger scale with as little work or
changes in everyday life as possible to make it more accessible was the beginning of this project.
I wanted to think about what could help guide actions toward good consequences to improve the
lives of others.
This project, then, is meant to encourage life changes that people can take to be more
deliberative in facilitating moral progress. Moral progress is intrinsically good, and we should
want to do things that are intrinsically good. If moral progress is intrinsically good then we
should want to create a pathway toward more or it, and if that is the case then we will feel much
more satisfied creating it through deliberate action. The intuition about deliberate action and
moral progress is what guided the methodology of this work. I opted to take a pluralistic
approach by appealing to intuitions and judgements that we have to certain scenarios and
situations we encounter and build up from there. There are several reasons for choosing to
conduct my project this way. Most importantly, moral theories can produce paradoxical results
that can seem to lead to the wrong answer, which we know is the wrong answer because of our
judgements about the scenario. 3 If our judgements are what inform our decision about moral
theory, then judgements about a scenario are more reliable for determining what to do in the
specific case than a more abstract theory. Additionally, it seems that judgements in this way are
easier to justify than appeal to a moral theory. 4 Meaning that using intuitions or judgements that
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we have about the scenarios I will discuss is likely going to help my reader accept more of my
argument if they share the same judgements.
What is a deliberative action or set of actions that we can do that are likely to result in
moral progress on a large scale? Civic engagement. Civic engagement, such as voting, is the
biggest way that the average citizen is able to tell their government what their expectations are
for treatment of others. It is a type of dialogue, and through voting and other means of
engagement people can demand a certain level of moral progress if done properly. In keeping
with the idea that I wanted to find a way that allowed people to help facilitate moral progress in a
way that did not cause people who are already generally good to alter their lives significantly.
Moral progress is a burden, but I do not believe it should be one that is overwhelming. Therefore,
civic engagement seemed to be the best place to start looking for ways to help facilitate moral
progress as long as people are making deliberate choices toward a good outcome. Thus, this
project is mainly a work on bettering how we engage civically.
To approach this, I began my project by looking at the general principles that would
orient people toward making good deliberate choices. In my first chapter on apathy, I derive two
duties: a duty to care and a duty to reason well. These are the two duties that we ought to fulfil in
order to interact and engage with others. In my apathy chapter, I began with the assumption that
past moral progress has helped us achieve the point in time and morality that we currently find.
Since we enjoy the benefits of living out the work that has been done to achieve this progress, we
ought to work to continue it. Failure to recognize this is apathy, and apathy is morally
blameworthy because it causes us to neglect our duties to others. My argument is that we have a
duty to care about the lives of others in a way that motivates us to want to help them be able to
solve some of their problems. Caring about others is the first step in being willing to see the

areas of their lives that might be suffering from a hindrance in moral progress. There may be
some area or obstacle that is preventing them from being on the same level as others, and we
ought to care enough about others to want to find those and help them overcome it. From there,
we then have a duty to reason well about how best to help others. It is important that in choosing
to do something, we do it well so that we do not waste resources.
The second chapter of my project focuses on the biggest way that we can all be civically
engaged. After developing principles about a duty to care and a duty to reason well, it is
important to put them to good use. Voting is one of the easiest and most impactful ways that we
can be a part of making large decisions that affect the entire country. In my voting chapter, I
work through all of the problems with voting. Voting is usually done badly because voters are
both irrational and incompetent when it comes to reasoning through the complex issues that are
on the ballot. Instead of using this as a reason to not vote, I argue that this is a failure of a duty to
reason well about the lives of others. We still ought to vote, but we ought to vote well. Voting
well requires us to be able to reason through all of these issues at hand to make a choice that is
going to be the best overall, for everyone. To do this, I advocate that voters turn to the advice of
experts to understand the problems at hand and their potential solutions. From there, voters
would be better equipped to vote well. I focus on voting well because voting is an aspect of our
society that elects the people that are responsible for framing how we live out our daily lives, and
because voting is not going to go away.
The main problem that can lead voters astray when making rational decisions about
policy issues is their group loyalty. This is the topic of the last chapter in my project. Group
loyalties impair our ability to reason well because they cause motivated cognition, which in turn
makes it difficult to assess and vote well. In this chapter I focus on two group loyalties in

particular that I think most people encounter every election: partisanship and patriotism.
Partisanship influences how likely we are to hear the other side of the issue and form a wellrounded opinion. Instead we are inclined to dismiss someone who does not share our party
affiliation as already wrong before even hearing what they have to say. Patriotism is in the same
vein because patriotism causes people to think only in terms of their nation instead of looking at
the collective. Each of these results in voters choosing suboptimal solutions and suboptimal
results. Group loyalties are a result of our social identity, or the identity that we derive from our
membership in different groups, which make them incredibly difficult to overcome when
reasoning. This is the main reason that they are such an obstacle to voting because in order to
vote better, voters need to be more rational about their choices.
Now, to summarize how these three parts all fit together. I begin my project by
discussing general principles of morality and what we should be striving toward. Moral progress
is at the center of this investigation, and I argue that if we do not work to continue moral
progress, we are doing something morally blameworthy and ought to avoid it. This results in two
duties that underlie how we should interact with one another in our communities: a duty to care
and a duty to reason well. These two duties help us to be deliberate in our actions toward moral
progress. Then I turn to look at an activity that the community does as a whole on a systematic
basis. We all vote to make decisions about the trajectory of our communities and country at
large. We need to use these duties as a framework for how we should be approaching our voting
decisions and vote accordingly. Group loyalties fit into this picture because it is something that
gets in the way of applying these duties to reasoning well because it is ingrained in our nature
and our subconscious. Learning practical ways to make progress in combating all of these issues
to conform as best we can to living in accordance with a duty to care and a duty to reason well is

the ultimate aim of this thesis. Finally, I will conclude this project with a discussion with
suggestions for where research can continue on and where there are areas for other developments
or improvements on my arguments.

APATHY

Introduction
There is a myriad of social problems that are affecting groups of people all over the
world. I mean, turn on the news and you’ll likely be met with images of tragedy from across the
globe, with some positive stories sprinkled in between the hardships. They are everywhere.
Social injustices or problems are persistent challenges that can damage a specific group, breed
conflict between groups, or in some way create unjust obstacles for a certain population.
Examples of social injustices are human rights violations, discrimination, or immigration
restrictions. Social injustices such as violations of human rights create unjust obstacles through
preventing access to human liberties and standards of life such as those laid out in the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights that all countries sign and agree to enforce.5
Failure to enforce human rights denies people the basic rights they should be guaranteed, which
creates and unjust obstacle to living a free life. Discrimination causes unjust obstacles for people
through the systematic disadvantages it creates within a state. By definition, discrimination is the
unjust mistreatment of a specific group on the basis of some aspect of their identity. 6 Immigrants,
like with discrimination, face several systematic disadvantages but also face violations of human
rights. In other words, immigration restrictions and discrimination cause unjust obstacles and
removal of access to basic liberties that should be protected human rights. 7

United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-humanrights/ (Accessed: 11/17/2019).
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There are a host of other social problems that could be mentioned here, but the main
criteria of social problems is the impact they have on the targeted groups. These are problems of
a large caliber that have serious consequences for vulnerable populations if they continue to
persist. When thinking about, responding to, and engaging with these social problems, my
biggest worry is that people simply do not care enough about the big problems of today, and if
they do care, they tend to fall short when it comes to engaging with them. How are we going to
work to solve these problems if we do not even know where to start in the first place?
Take my friend Butz for example. Butz is genuinely a nice guy, he will always be there
when one of his friends needs support, and he tries his best to be what he considers a good
person. At first glance, Butz is a good person, doing his best to live his life according to some set
of values, but when we dig a little deeper, it is obvious that Butz is lacking in an important way.
See, Butz thinks deliberating on social injustices is not worth his time. In his mind, he already
knows how to be a good person, already knows that there are massive problems out in the world,
and already knows that he is only one person who likely cannot make much of a difference on
his own. He also is well aware that the world is incredibly complex and figuring out how to solve
some of these large social injustices plaguing society nowadays will be nearly, if not completely,
impossible. Butz argues that he does not know all of the information, nor does he care enough
about the wide varieties of problems to drum up a desire to educate himself on them. He
questions why should he care about ethics and societal problems when he can continue with his
daily life unaffected otherwise?
I am sure that Butz is not the only person who thinks this way, in fact, I am fairly certain
that there are many people who are led to the same conclusions that he has drawn. People like
Butz are what I consider the apathetic person. Apathy, taken generally, is those who adopt a

“don't know, don't care” type of attitude toward these larger social problems. The apathetic
person goes about her day by performing the tasks required of her. She is a decent employee,
occasionally donates excess income to charity, and even makes sure to call her parents every
once in a while, but she never concerns herself with the bigger problems at large because they
seemingly do not affect her life. My main concerns are the repercussions of such an attitude. I
will argue that the apathetic person is wrong, or morally blameworthy. The goal of this chapter is
to establish a duty to care and a duty to reason well about social injustices because we fail to
fulfil our moral obligations otherwise, take unacceptable moral risks, and are generally
ineffective in moral progress. To accomplish this goal, I will systematically work through each
of the premises in my argument that I believe leads us to a duty to care and a duty to reason well
about social injustices. I will then consider objections to my claims and complete this chapter
with the practical applications of my arguments.
Here is a brief summary of my argument:
1. Past moral progress has done work to achieve p
2. By taking advantage of or claiming the benefits of p, one actively benefits
from past efforts to achieve p
3. Once we claim p, we are then active and willing beneficiaries
4. If someone actively benefits from past moral progress, then they incur an
obligation to continue moral progress
5. It is morally risky and ineffective to not be aware of our obligations
6. It is morally blameworthy to not continue moral progress of which you
have been a past beneficiary

7. It is morally blameworthy to not recognize moral risks and ineffectiveness
that arises from an unawareness of obligations
8. Apathy is a failure to do/acknowledge 4&5
9. Apathy is morally blameworthy
10. We must have a duty to care and a duty to reason well to avoid the moral
risks and harms associated with apathy.

Past Moral Progress
I will start this section with a definition of moral progress. Moral progress, I take it, is
intelligent activism that has been done to achieve the current status of the society in which we
presently reside. Intelligent activism is the past series of actions that have used critical thinking
skills to advance the rights and protections of liberties of others. It is not simply activism that has
led to some good outcome, but the process behind activism that hedges bets toward a good
outcome. Intelligent activsim is a methodology of assessing situational climates, using resources
effectively toward progress, and making precise steps toward a predetermined end goal. It must
have a component of strategy involved in how the advancement of rights and protections of
liberties was achieved. Intelligent activism is presumably good since it secures the expansion of
rights for more and more groups of people. To put it another way, sometime in the past, someone
else used intelligent activism to effectively and strategically convince others of a need for change
that resulted in our present society that is better than before in some targeted way. We are free of
feudal serfdom, slavery was abolished, and women and minorities have the right to not face
discrimination in the workplace for example. These acts of intelligent activism have created the
society that we live in and reap the benefits of whether we are aware of them or not. Most

importantly, without the work of intelligent activists we would not see the kind of progress that
we see today. For the remainder of this paper, I use intelligent activism to mean the above.
The intrinsic value of intelligent activism is the deliberate nature of it. It is the deliberate
use of critical thinking and logical reasoning skills to achieve some better end. Using intelligent
activism to make decisions is valuable because it forces us to make decisions in a more well
thought out way. Being more deliberate and more thoughtful of the types of decisions that we are
making and the ends that we are working to achieve is good of how it makes us evaluate the
trajectory that we are pursuing. Intelligent activism does not allow us to wait for good things to
happen by accident. Instead, it forces us to take control to steer toward better in a structured way.
It is better to pursue good things on purpose because it leads to better than accidental good
outcomes.
Here my guiding assumption is that rational thought, not necessarily strict intelligence,
applied to social injustices is only good. There are several cases where rational thought has
successfully led to more benefits and protections for people with limited change to their daily
lives. One example of this is organ donation registrations. Many countries in the European
Union, such as France and Sweden, have “presumed consent” when it comes to whether or not
someone is to be an organ donor, meaning that citizens must opt out of being a donor instead of
opting in.8 What is surprising about this case is that the percentage of organ donors in countries
with the opt out policy actually have organ donor rates that are highly similar to the actual rate of
people who respond to surveys that they believe in organ donation than those countries who have
an opt out policy. Conversely, whereas countries with an opt out policy are close to the actual
rate of people who say that they would be donors, countries such as the United States who have
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opt in policies are seeing thousands of people die each year while waiting for an organ, even
though there are likely thousands of people who would agree to be donors but are not. 9
Interestingly enough, these two types of policies do not see a significant difference in overall
willingness to donate an organ, so it must be the type of policy that makes the difference.
This is an example where rational thought can be applied to large social problems,
namely the lack of organs available for donation, in a way that facilitates a better outcome. It
makes more logical sense to have a presumed consent policy when polls have shown
overwhelming acceptance for a phenomenon because it removes a barrier of entry. 10 It is easier
for people to participate in certain programs that they likely will already want to participate in
when they are automatically enrolled. Here, thinking rationally did not take any more
intelligence than normal, rather it required someone to use critical thinking to find a way to
overcome obstacles that were causing the problem.
Furthermore, those who feel strongly about what happens to their organs after their death
will be more likely to search our and utilize the opt out option of an opt in system. 11 Again, the
use of critical thinking led to this solution to the organ availability problem. Statistically, it is
common to find that those who feel strongly about something will self select to either be a part of
the project or will go out of their way to opt out. It is why we are aware of self selection bias.
Therefore, it is likely that those who feel strongly about not allowing their organs to be donated
after their death will find and use the opt out function. This slight change in protocol was able to
save thousands of lives, not by implementing a wildly new system or through a revolutionary
scientific breakthrough, but because of rational thought applied to an issue.

Ibid
Ibid
11 Ibid
9
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The intelligent activism for opt-out policies is understood through focusing on how we
frame organ donation. Studies have shown that changing the presentation of organ donation as an
opt in policy, which makes donation seem superogratory, to an opt out policy, which makes
donation appear more standard, encourages more people to donate their organs as their
perspective on organ donation is shifted. 12 So, if opt out policies were to spread to the United
States, framing organ donation as an action that is normal rather than heroic, would cause more
people to likely be more willing to donate their organs, and then the United States can begin to
see the same benefits as other opt out countries. The researchers from the study mentioned above
are advocating for this shift of language as a mechanism for solving the problem of organ
donation as it has worked in other places. This example illustrates how the intelligent activism
used by leaders to better the lives of others under their leadership. Intelligent activism becomes
increasingly important as leaders gain more and more influence over their followers’ lives.
So far, rational thinking seems to result in a better outcome if we anticipate the ways that
the populace will fall short and build in ways to prevent their downfall into society, but can this
same type of reasoning be said of other social injustices? To answer this question, I will apply
these concepts to the cases of civil rights and women’s suffrage. If I am successful in showing
how applying critical thinking and intelligent activism is what led to the outcomes of these
movements, and that these movements had beneficial results, then my argument that past moral
progress has led us to this point in time in our society is successful.
The American Civil Rights movement in the middle part of the twentieth century was a
fight to get equal rights for everyone in the United States under the law. Intelligent activism
initiated by leaders of the Civil Rights movement played a major role in eventually changing the
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minds of the nation. Specifically, the use of nonviolence to illustrate the violence that was the
major undertone of many of the segregation laws forced white people to come to the conclusion
that their old ways of life were wrong. When minority groups use nonviolence, they force the
opposing side to either continue their violence against unarmed and nonthreatening people, or to
reconsider their actions to better conform to the concepts of “fair play” in engagement.13 It asks
how the oppressor can continue to be violent against people who have done nothing to provoke
the violence, which in turn causes bystanders and onlookers to rethink their support of the
oppressing side. The use of nonviolence is a form of intelligent activism because it has a way of
forcing oppressors to reevaluate their viewpoints when faced with the scenario in which the side,
they favor is using violence against one unthreatening group.
Furthermore, there were other, lesser known, leaders who were working to sway the topmost level of America, the president. One of these lesser known heroes of the Civil Rights
Movement in the United States is Whitney Young Jr. Outside of his impressive track record in
social work and community outreach, he was also credited as being the man “who helped bridge
the gap between white political and business leaders and poor blacks and militants,” in strategic
ways.14 Young was also an advisor to two U.S. presidents, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B.
Johnson, on the issues surrounding racial problems and civil rights. His work with these two
presidents is credited with making significant headway into gaining civil rights for minorities. 15
He employed necessary tactics to appeal to groups on either side of racial issues to help them
reach a common solution. Young is an example of an individual activist that used intelligent
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11/17/2019)
15 Ibid.
13

activism because of his strategic moves toward civil rights and ability to persuade the appropriate
parties of his cause.
Women’s suffrage is similar to the arguments presented by the American Civil Rights
movement. When women were fighting for their right to be considered equal under the law, they
used critical thinking to most effectively convince the public of their position. This is why
women’s suffrage coincides with prohibition. It was not a mistake that at the same time the
United States was concerned over the dangers of drinking, and what alcohol was doing to
American families, that women also started to advocate harder for their right to vote.
Conventional arguments prior to this stated that women simply did not need the right to vote
because they were too “emotional” to handle the right to vote, 16 and because they would vote
along the same lines as their husbands. Then, when a fear of alcohol and its repercussions began
to concern the greater population, the argument that women needed the right to vote to protect
themselves from their husbands that were spending their time drinking did not seem entirely
implausible anymore.17 The growing concern over the effects of alcohol gave the suffrage
movement the momentum that it needed to project women’s rights into the sphere of national
concern. Suffragists used intelligent activism to seize the timing of the prohibition movement to
accomplish their own agenda. People were already concerned about one issue; intelligent
activism suggests that the solution be something that solves two problems at once.
The women that led the women’s suffrage movement acted at a critical time in history, a
moment when they knew that their situation would look the most sympathetic, and they acted. It
takes a high level of critical thinking to understand the political climate of any established nation,
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and then to further understand the potential ways that other issues might interact within it is an
even larger exercise in logic. The ability to understand how several issues corresponded and to
know how to get the correct voices on your side is incredibly well thought out, and resulted
eventually in the passing of legislation, the nineteenth amendment in 1920, granting women the
right to vote. Arguably, the right to vote expanded the rights of a select group of people, namely
women, which has the potential to elevate their current situation. They were then able to begin to
participate in the system that had been oppressing them for so long. This in turn led many more
women to begin to participate in politics and begin to systematically attack and overturn sexist
laws and precedents.
Now, in both of these cases it appears that the rights of both groups fighting against the
status quo expanded, and for the eventual betterment of those groups. This in my view was moral
progress since these were calculated moves toward a common end that promoted expansion of
rights. The granting of further rights enabled these groups to begin to form a better society, it
opened a path for them to fight directly against oppressive systems to begin the long journey
toward justice. There is also a question of who the intelligent activist is. Leaders, because of their
influence and power, have more of a burden and ability to contribute to moral progress. Normal
people who are not in leadership positions are able to be intelligent activists in smaller ways that
still move toward moral progress. Therefore, moral progress through intelligent activism and
utilization of critical thinking has brought us to this point in society.

Obligation to Continue Moral Progress
Now that we have established that intelligent activism that contributed to moral progress
is what got us here today, we now must investigate how these past actions impact us. In this

section I will argue that because we benefit from past intelligent activism, we ought to work to
continue this moral progress through continued intelligent activism. To do this, I will argue that
we have an obligation to continue moral progress out of respect for past intelligent activists, and
we also have this obligation out of avoidance of free riding.
The reason that I argue that actions aimed at moral progress are the best way to achieve it
is because of the ability to claim deliberate action. Something that motivated this thesis was the
idea that deliberate action that leads to good outcomes are much better than those that do not
when we must claim responsibility. Deliberate actions that are aimed toward moral progress are
better than those that are not because we cannot claim that we wanted to accomplish those ends.
In that sense, it is impossible to actually work toward any good end if we are not being deliberate
about it. Further, we are already intervening in the lives of others in what we allow the state to
do, and moral progress, as I discussed above, is intertwined with what we allow the state to do.
Therefore, since we already intervene in these areas of peoples’ lives, we should do it in a way
that is deliberately trying to make it better. We can do this through intelligent activism.
Another intuition that motivates this section is that someone benefiting from some past
action, should then also contribute to moral progress. This thought initially struck me when
reading about people who have experienced some form of good and then devoted a significant
portion of their lives to helping others in some, sometimes unrelated, way. For example, Chen Si,
a man who has spent every weekend for over a decade patrolling the Nanjing Yangtze River
Bridge for potential suicide attempts and coaxes them back over the railing to him. From the
time that he started his volunteering he has been able to save over 321 lives and has begun
working with local psychology students from surrounding universities to offer even more aid. 18
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In an interview Chen says that he devotes such a huge part of his life to saving others because
when he was struggling to make a life for himself after leaving his village he was helped by a
stranger to get on his feet. Now, he feels that he should pay the favor forward and work to save
other people who are feeling like there is nowhere else to turn. 19 Chen acknowledges that he was
helped by someone who did not owe him anything, and now feels that he should do the same
now that he is in a position to do so.
It is the idea that we have benefitted from something in the past that was not owed to us,
then we ought to do something else to continue the good deed forward. Chen’s experience is not
unique. There are dozens of other news stories of people that are doing similar work or other
“pay it forward movements” that entire communities participate in to help others when they
experience random kindness. The COVID-19 pandemic has seen a huge emergence of these
types of movements in small communities looking to support one another. 20 There is some
intuition that tells us that when we have received some undeserved help or kindness, that we
ought to continue it on. Intelligent activism should function in the same way because it is a way
that we have achieved the rights that we have today that were previously thought to be
undeserved. Women did not have the right to vote before the suffragette movement because it
was thought that women did not need or deserve the right to vote. The thought was that women
would vote the same way that their husbands would vote or that they could not understand
politics. Now, we understand that these were deserved, just like in the other examples people
deserve as much kindness as we can give them. If we have these inclinations about small acts,
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then we should have the same reaction toward moral progress generally once we recognize that
we have benefitted from something in the past that we cannot repay.
Intelligent activism essentially framed the way that society is today. We live in a society
where there are protections for our rights and mechanisms for their enforcement. For example,
returning to my friend Butz, if he is experiencing discrimination at work, he has the right to go to
a Human Resources department and file a formal complaint that will likely be addressed
(assuming that he works for a company that generally adheres to the laws that a country has in
place). This shows two aspects about the effects of intelligent activism. The first is
acknowledging that certain actions or mindsets that previously were tolerated in the past are no
longer acceptable. It demonstrates the wrongs that intelligent activism worked to mediate were
wrongs that people continue to think are wrong. The second aspect of the effects of intelligent
activism and the rights that it brought is a claim to benefits. Through the exercise of these rights
gained from intelligent activism, one is actively claiming its benefits. In short, there is an
acknowledgement that the benefits from intelligent activism are deserved and must be granted.
Further, through the ability to exercise or use the benefits that led us to this moment, we also
become active participants in the field of moral progress.
Since we are all beneficiaries of some part of moral progress that intelligent activists
created for us, we should work to further this progress out of respect for the work that they did
for our betterment. We have an obligation to “return benefits to those who have benefitted us.” 21
This obligation derives from a duty to love others and to put their well-being above our own. It is
necessary to return benefits so that we do not foster negative emotions that could accompany an
unequal division of benefits between people. 22 In addition to returning benefits, we also have an
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obligation to “cultivate feelings of sympathy” that will allow us to better understand the plight of
others.23 It is not enough to simply be grateful for what past progress has given us, we should
work to continue the same mission of progress so that their efforts and sacrifices do not go to
waste, and we should strive to recognize where others may not be benefiting as much as we are
and work to help them. If we stop striving for moral progress, then we will have shortchanged
both ourselves and past intelligent activists. Respecting intelligent activism means that we must
continue their missions of moral progress since we cannot directly return the benefit to them.
Instead we should honor their work by continuing it to honor our obligations of returning the
benefit and of cultivating sympathy.
Further, we ought to continue the work of past intelligent activists because most
intelligent activism work is never completed. It takes enormous amounts of time and effort to see
a shift in a society where people are willing to change or abandon their deeply held beliefs. In
other words, we will likely always be able to find some way to honor the efforts of past activists
through continuing some part of their initial mission. For example, Title VII and Title IX are
both pieces of legislation that are products of intelligent activism that aimed at gaining rights for
oppressed and underrepresented people. These pieces of legislation are not only for those that
they directly benefit, but it is also helpful for the broader community. When people gain more
rights and access to freedoms, they are more able to contribute to their communities and also
advance moral progress to benefit others. The former prevents employment disrimination 24 and
the latter prevents discrimination for admittance to educational institutions.25 These two pieces
also developed from further activism following women’s and civil rights movements. They show
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how even though social progress attained these rights in theory, there is still so much work to be
done before these rights will actually be realized.
Title VII has been amended to better cover rights against employment discrimination
more than thirty years after the initial legislation went into effect. 26 Title IX has also seen several
other supplemental documents added to further support the goals of the original legislation added
as recently as the early 2000’s. 27 The fact that the rights granted in the two original pieces of
legislation needed further explanation through either amendments or supplemental documents
means, in my opinion, that even though there are mechanisms in place that are supposed to
guarantee rights, there is still work to be done to ensure that particular groups are actually
receiving the treatment and rights to which they are entitled. Therefore, we should work to
continue this progress so that we are not stopping with a half-solved problem that intelligent
activists spent their lives fighting toward.
Now, I do not mean to argue here that the intelligent activism that arose from these
advances in Title IX and Title VII were just activism that led to good outcomes. As I explained
before, intelligent activism is procedural, it is a process of careful rational reflection and critical
thinking that in turn leads to positive outcomes. The aspect of these two pieces of legislation,
their amendments, and supplemental documents is the process itself. My argument is that these
continued efforts toward the original goal of expanding rights for women, for example, shows
the employment of careful reflection and critical thinking. This process is, in my view, a
demonstration of further activism that is reflecting and finding gaps to fill in that past progress
missed, and critically thinking of new ways to fill them through legislation or other mechanisms,
to further secure these expanded rights. It is continuing the process of past intelligent activists.
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I argue that we cannot stop once we reach a half-solution to social problems. If we are
willing to stop at half-rights for targeted groups, then the goals of the initial intelligent activists
have failed because they set out to secure full rights for them. This is not to say that steps toward
solving a problem are not successes in themselves, but rather that partial solutions to problems
are not full solutions. It is not enough to argue that some rights are better than no rights because
we should still be working toward the realization of full rights or solutions. To put this another
way, we cannot say that a slight improvement in social injustices means that we should stop
trying to solve them. It would be disrespectful to both intelligent activists and the victims of
social problems to argue that since there have been some advances, that we do not need to
concern ourselves with moral progress.
To clarify, I argue that we have obligations to contribute to moral progress generally and
not simply the ones from which we specifically have benefited because of how interwoven
different areas of moral progress are with others. Past moral progress has led us to where we are
today, and there are a ton of interconnected ways that one action of past moral progress has
influenced another form of moral progress that has led us to this point. We should be helping
continue all moral progress. In other words, I believe that the different moral progresses that
have led us to where we are now are all so interwoven, it would be incredibly difficult to
determine specifically which kind of moral progress benefitted us the most. We will likely know
that some have helped us along more than others, but there are likely going to be other instances
of moral progress that we could miss, and therefore leave out if we were only committed to
helping moral progress from which we benefitted. Further, as I argued earlier, it would be
disrespectful to past intelligent activists to not continue their goals toward moral progress, and

accidentally leaving one form of moral progress out in this way would be disrespecting their past
efforts, which we should avoid.
Our duties to others depend on being oriented to their needs and to give them the respect
that they deserve as human beings, and to give this respect we must “value others as endsetters”.28 The value another person has as an end-setter means that we acknowledge their ability
to have authority over their own reasoning ability, and we should afford them this authority over
their own lives. This authority can also be considered a claim to something, and we have a duty
out of respect for the person to respond to their claims.29 We are beneficiaries of past moral
progress and are in a position that can be oriented toward helping others achieve the same ends.
It would be incredibly privileged to think that since we arbitrarily were included in the
beneficiary group and not someone else, that we are not obligated to help them. It could just as
easily have been us that was left disadvantaged instead.
The second reason that I believe we have an obligation to help advance moral progress is
so that we avoid free riding on other efforts of intelligent activism. Intelligent activism is the
application of critical thinking and logic to social problems. It is a way of addressing these issues
in a strategic way that is the most likely to result in success. This is why I argued above that
intelligent activism is the framework of our society, because most of the successful activism has
used logic and critical thinking to assess, strategize, and execute successful movements.
Intelligent activism is a public good because it is nonexcludable and because it is
beneficial to everyone who is able to use it, but when there is a public good there is also the
problem of free riders. So, as the amount of intelligent activism increases, the more moral
progress we will be able to achieve for society. This was the case in the past, which caused moral
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progress that then led to more recognition and additional human rights, and this creates a cycle of
moral progress. Everyone benefits from the addition of more human rights that improves their
quality of life and access to mechanisms to enforcement. Free riders of intelligent activism are
the people that take advantage of this moral progress, those who are active and willing
beneficiaries, without also contributing to moral progress themselves. They are the ones who
enjoy the benefits that others have provided. 30 Free riding also unfairly places the burden to
provide a good on the others in the group. This unfair burden will cause two harms, firstly the
agents that are contributing to moral progress will experience an undue burden and burnout, and
secondly due to this burnout there will be less moral progress since there will be less people
willing to contribute to a cause that has free riders.
The first problem of free riders is that they push those that are using these important
critical thinking skills required by intelligent activism to push themselves to overcompensate.
Overcompensating in any scenario to account for free riders will lead to burn out, but I argue that
this is particularly the case when it comes to facilitating moral progress. The mental strength and
discipline that having good morals generally takes is taxing on the average person. It is why
there is an entire branch of philosophy concerned with determining what our moral requirements
are despite this potential for burnout and discontent. Susan Wolf in her piece on “Moral Saints”
argues that trying to devote our lives to a moral ideal will result ultimately in a denial of life’s
other joys.31 In the case of the free riding problem, if others recognize their duty to help facilitate
moral progress, and the free rider, recognizing their benefits, fails to do their fair share of
intelligent activism or critical thinking, then they are placing this incredibly arduous burden on
others. This additional burden will cause others to deny themselves other joys in life, which leads
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to a greater increase in their unhappiness. One could argue, then, that by free riding and placing
undue burdens on others, a free rider is the cause of the discontent of others and the failure to
encourage moral progress.
The second problem with free riders is that they will eventually cause so much burnout in
agents acting in the interest of moral progress that they will stop fighting for moral progress. It is
incredibly difficult to keep expending significant energy to provide a public good such as
intelligent activism when others are also not reciprocating and contributing. This will
disincentive people from encouraging moral progress. It is irrational to continue to provide a
good that will not be reciprocated and that has such a high cost to an individual after an extended
period of time. Once there is no incentive to work toward moral progress, it will harm the entire
system of intelligent activism because there will be less people working for solutions to social
problems. It will fail to respect the efforts from the past as I mentioned earlier, and it will fail to
expand to encompass those left out of past progress. Additionally, if there is no incentive to
contribute to moral progress, what is the incentive to maintain it?
In order to avoid these harms, the free rider should then be obligated to contribute to
moral progress. Contributing to moral progress through intelligent means, by using critical
thinking and logic, will avoid disrespecting the past efforts of activists that achieved the current
state that we are privileged to live in presently and those who do not enjoy the same benefits that
active beneficiaries enjoy, and it will avoid the problem of free riding that will cause harm to
those that are working toward moral progress by placing an undue burden on them and causing
their burnout. We have an obligation to prevent harm that we cause to others because it does not
make sense to rely on a system that benefits you without contributing to it.

Moral Risk
Obligations are accompanied by a moral risk for failure to comply with them. It is
morally risky to fail to fulfil our obligations because the “mere risk of making a deep moral
mistake rules out certain acts,” or behaviors. 32 To illustrate the relationship between moral risk
and obligation, I will return to my friend Butz. Imagine now that Butz, after hearing my previous
arguments, is now concerned about his obligations to moral progress. He has weighed all of the
arguments that he has heard so far and has defeated all of them with logic or counter examples.
Overall, it appears that he has done all of the mental work that should allow him to feel relatively
confident about his conclusion that he does not have an obligation to encourage moral progress.
Moral risk asks whether or not Butz should be confident in his conclusions given how harmful
failing to advance moral progress can be for everyone. Say, for example, that Butz in his
deliberation had to employ some fairly nuanced philosophical arguments to defeat earlier
arguments about moral progress.33 There is likely a chance of mistake in his deliberation. If Butz
did make a mistake in his deliberation, then he would be wrong about not having an obligation to
advance moral progress and would fail to fulfil his duties as such. Is that a risk that Butz should
be willing to take?
Answering this question is contingent upon how Butz sees how change happens and
whether he thinks that there are also risks of engaging in intelligent activism. However, we
should assume in this scenario that moral progress can only result in benefits. If people were
acting in a way that intervened in the lives of others without contemplation of the outcomes, they
could cause more harm than good. They could be manipulating others for their own ends without
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treating others as their own end setters.34 The aim at moral progress necessarily means that there
is a benefit to be had because moral progress provides more rights and liberties to everyone,
especially those that were lacking it in the first place. More access to rights is intrinsically good
because it allows people to better function as end setters in their own right. So, striving toward
moral progress means striving toward a benefit and we ought to keep striving toward more good
than risk allowing bad to continue. We owe it to ourselves and others to want to make progress
in making society better and allowing more people to be granted the same freedoms that we
enjoy so that we treat them as end setters and rational beings worthy of such respect.
There are two ways of assessing this question. The first is that we should refrain from
doing anything. The idea is that if we don't know then we should not act because we could
accidentally cause more harm than our intended good.35 Though I fail to see how this is different
from the free rider case. If we continue to do nothing, then we are essentially allowing the harms
that I discussed in the section above. By refraining from doing anything we allow others to do all
of the work for us and we do not contribute at all. In fact, by doing nothing we run the risk of
things getting worse and worse instead of better. Doing nothing causes whatever harms that are
currently happening to keep happening. Intelligent activism hinges on assessing the situation
before acting, and if we are intelligent activists then it does more harm to do nothing than to act
in a way that deliberately moves toward what we see as moral progress through logical reasoning
and critical thinking.
My answer to whether or not Butz should be willing to take such a risk is that he should
not. Butz should not be willing to risk being wrong about his obligation and make things worse
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instead of working to continue moral progress since it would be detrimental to others. It appears
to me that since making arguments in moral philosophy leaves room for error no matter how
solid the argument due to the nature of moral arguments themselves. There is debate on
essentially every topic under the sun, and even if philosophers agree that something is wrong,
they likely disagree as to why. This illustrates that the likelihood that a philosophical argument is
correct, and that the moral risk involved with that assessment is going to be worthwhile, is
presumably going to fail. So, if there is a strong likelihood that we could be wrong about what
our obligations are for moral progress, it is likely better to err on the side of providing more
benefits to others than to do nothing at all and risk harming them. This is because deliberate
actions aimed toward intelligent progress can only yield benefits.
Another component of moral risk is ineffectiveness. If we are obligated to help moral
progress, then we should do so through intelligent means. Intelligent activism is how we have
seen moral progress in the past as I have argued previously, and intelligent activism is likely the
means through which we will continue to foster moral progress. So, we must use critical thinking
and logic to assess the social problems around us, and then determine what the best course of
action will be to ameliorate these problems. This same line of argument is used to praise
effective altruism. It is good to maximize the level of good that we can do in the world, and
using effective measures are built into the exercise of intelligent activism. 36 It is not enough to do
something to try to solve problems, but we should be solving problems in effective ways. The
reason that I argue effectiveness in solving moral problems is critical when considering moral
risk is that ineffectiveness is a waste. We want to ensure that we are doing the most with the
limited resources that are available to us, and we want to see our efforts pay off or there will be
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less of an incentive to help moral progress. After all, the payoff for moving forward moral
progress is likely worth a risk if it means allowing others the freedom to live out their lives with
the respect and dignity that they are due.
When people attempt to facilitate moral progress by trying to fix problems through
unintelligent means, such as being uninformed or misinformed for example, likely they likely
will not bring about effective solutions to social problems. They will not have the tools necessary
to fully grapple with the wide array of facets of these issues and will likely find ineffective
solutions. Even if, through unintelligent means, the result is a reliable and effective means
toward unintelligent means may occasionally move us closer to solutions and moral progress, but
they are likely the result of a happy accident or chance. Effective activism, on the other hand, is
usually accompanied by some metric of evaluation that will accurately evaluate and reflect the
success of efforts.37 So, the more reliable means to consistently making moral progress is
through the use of intelligent activism. Although, it is important to note here that intelligent
activists will be aware that there may be risks that are too great. So, while it is better to err on the
side of contributing to moral progress, there could be a direct risk to harming others through
one’s actions that would require the intelligent activist to refrain. However, it is important to note
that the risk that would outweigh working toward moral progress would have to outweigh the
benefit that someone would gain from access to more freedoms and rights.
Further, when we are working toward a project, we want to make sure that our limited
resources are actually making progress toward our end goal. If our resources are not working
toward our end goal and we are never seeing any type of progress on our projects, then the
endeavor will feel futile. We should therefore choose projects of moral progress that are closest
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to us and will work on issues that are most salient to our daily lives. This is likely where we can
do the most good. There is a normative importance of the projects and issues that are closest to
us and warrant our immediate attention due to their proximity and their relationship to us
individually.38 We must take care of the issues closest to us in an effective manner before we will
have the capacity to tackle those further away.
The proximity of issues to handle first is important for two reasons, first it allows us in a
country where a significant amount of moral progress has already been made, to keep practicing
on the same projects that have already begun, and secondly it will allow us to bring more people
under the umbrella of beneficiaries of past moral progress much easier. The practice is important
when it comes to working toward moral progress because it will allow people to hone their
critical thinking and logic skills to work toward being better intelligent activists, so that when
intelligent activism becomes more difficult as we expand beyond our own communities and
countries, we are better equipped to grapple with those new challenges. Also, when bringing
more people into the realm of being a beneficiary of past moral progress, then they too will incur
an obligation to continue this same moral progress, and there will then be more and more people
working for moral progress. The more people that are striving for moral progress through
intelligent means, the more progress we can make overall. In theory this would keep making the
cycle of moral progress move faster and faster.
To summarize, it is morally risky to fail to meet an obligation to continue moral progress
because of the potential harm it could cause to others, and it is ineffective to not fulfil these
obligations through intelligent means. This is to say that as long as the risk of helping moral
progress is not outweighed by the benefit of allowing someone to reach their full potential for an
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autonomous being. Ineffectiveness is morally risky because it would slow moral progress and
then would keep more and more people suffering from social problems for longer periods of
time. Overall, we should attempt to honor our obligations to moral progress to hedge our bets so
that we are not contributing to the harm of others.

Moral Blameworthiness & Apathy
I have established above that there are several ways that failing to help continue moral
progress causes potential harm to others, and that it fails to respect the efforts of those intelligent
activists that worked to accomplish the moral progress that beneficiaries enjoy. My argument up
until this point has been two-fold, one about the harms that could be caused and the other about
the respect that we owe to others. In this section I will argue that it is morally blameworthy to
both fail to contribute to moral progress and honor those obligations we incur in virtue of being
said beneficiary, and to not recognize the moral risks associated with ineffectiveness to fulfil and
unawareness of our obligations. I will conclude this section by arguing that the person that fails
in these ways is apathetic, and therefore the apathetic person is morally blameworthy.
It is morally blameworthy to be the cause of other’s harm. The harms that I have
demonstrated above that arise from free riding, a failure to respect other’s past actions, and a
failure to account for moral risks either through neglecting the potential for great harm, or for
inadequate work toward moral progress, are best summarized in the context of a type of
arrogance. Arrogance is characterized by “an unwillingness to grant others the space or
consideration she demands to oneself.”39 This means that the arrogant person is not willing or
simply does not think to allocate the same level of respect to others that they expect for
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themselves. Further, arrogance is necessarily an “interpersonal matter,” 40 rather than just based
on the internal musings of an individual. Here, I do not mean to indicate the traditional character
flaw of arrogance that we teach young children to stay away from, I mean an attitude that is
focused primarily on the needs of the self in comparison to the needs of others. Arrogance, then,
is a reflection of how someone sees themselves relative to others in a way that does not
acknowledge the full dignity and respect of the person. The arrogant attitude can be applied to all
three of the areas that I demonstrated harms to others.
Free riding as I discussed above is the refusal or failure to contribute to a public good,
such as intelligent activism. Free riding is problematic because it places an undue burden on
others to provide the public good, which, as I argued, can cause harm to others by causing
burnout and a disincentive to provide moral progress. So, this would cause harm to both
benefactors and beneficiaries of moral progress and make the entire thing worse off. The free
rider sees the moral progress that others are working toward, and decides that while they are
benefitting from it, they do not need to contribute to moral progress themselves. The free riding
attitude is wrong because it appears as though it does not allocate the appropriate amount of
respect to people that they deserve just by virtue of their being a human being.41 Respecting
another person is to respect their efforts and to not cause them additional harm. The arrogant
person does not respect the value of others when they fail to minimize the harm that others
experience through not contributing to continued moral progress. Essentially the free rider is
arrogant because they believe that they are relieved of a duty to contribute since they are
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benefitting without having to participate. The free rider is primarily concerned with the benefits
afforded to themselves, and not concerned with the needs of others, which is arrogant.
Similarly, when one fails to recognize the efforts of others from the past that have
resulted in moral progress through intelligent activism, they are failing to respect their past work.
Someone else’s projects are an inherent part of who they are, 42 and if we are the beneficiaries of
this progress, then we should contribute to the continued efforts toward making progress in that
field out of respect. As I discussed above, our duties to others requires that we respect them in a
way that honors their projects because their projects are an important part of their personhood.
Therefore, to respect intelligent activists of the past, we ought to respect their projects and
contribute to them to fulfil our duties to others. Intelligent activists sacrificed their time and
energy in order to make gains in moral progress. We must respect people due to their inner
worth, or human dignity, and to allow someone else’s sacrifices of which we are active
beneficiaries, is disrespectful of their efforts. All of this is not to say that we ought to devote our
entire lives to contributing to moral progress, but that we ought to devote some of our time to it.
We can still have our own projects and commitments. We must find a balance between the
sacrifices that we ought to make to contribute to moral progress and contributing to our own
projects.
Thirdly, ineffectiveness can also be viewed as not caring enough about a problem to find
a solution “the right way,” and instead trying to cut corners or refuse to do the appropriate
legwork to be appropriately informed to find an adequate solution for social problems. I argue
that this too is an exercise of arrogance. Arrogance is interpersonal and a refusal to allocate the
respect that one thinks is due to oneself, to others. Here I am assuming that most people, if their
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rights were violated, would object to the treatment. In other words, they would push back against
that treatment and demand that others recognize their right, or at the very least be angry about
how others were treating them. They would recognize that the treatment they were receiving was
wrongful because it does not honor their rights allocated to people universally. When one works
in an ineffective manner, they are essentially committed to the idea that the moral progress they
are supposedly working toward can afford to wait, since ineffective solutions inevitably will
prolong the amount of time before a real solution is reached. In other words, by allowing
ourselves to be ineffective we are not only disrespecting ourselves by wasting our limited
resources on projects that will not work, but also diminishing the importance of the social
problems we are trying to ameliorate by accepting the prolonged timeline.
Now that I have established that these three harms can be roughly attributed to something
along the lines of arrogance, or a lack of respect for others, I must now establish why that
attitude is wrong. Arrogance is a vice because it fails to give proper respect to others, but there
are more reasons that arrogance is problematic. Arrogance leads one to mistreat others since one
does not recognize another's human value in themselves.43 Inherent in this idea is the privileging
of oneself over others and taking one’s needs to be first in every scenario. This is also evidenced
by the comparative aspect of arrogance, if the arrogant person is primarily concerned with the
needs of themselves, 44 then they will likely not engage with the needs of others unless it has
some benefit to themselves. Arrogance is focused on the individual and does not look outward to
see where there may be room for improvement. We must give others their “turn” to have their
needs take priority, and we should work to genuinely give them the attention and effort that they
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deserve.45 If we fail to do this, then we are treating others arrogantly, and that is morally
blameworthy. We will not be solving problems or respecting each other if we are arrogant.
Further, the worse things are, the more important it is for people to not be arrogant. The
question when confronting arrogant attitudes is this: why should you benefit so much? The
answer is that likely you should not, but you can work to make the benefit gap smaller to better
justify the difference. The worse things are, the more morally risky it is to not want to close this
gap because it could leave people behind in more terrible conditions. Arrogant people have an
obligation to change their attitude to see others as connected to themselves and recognizing the
human value in others is the only way to make their lives more justifiable and to move toward
moral progress.
The apathetic person is one who lives in a society where they are privileged enough to
have the ability to be arrogant. Apathy adopts an attitude of not caring about the needs of others
and not being informed enough to know the details of large social problems. In short, the
apathetic person does not have enough of a sense of caring about the plight of others that they are
not face to face with every day to want to help. Apathy appears to be a case of a low level of
arrogance, not an attitude of malintent but an attitude of not applying the same considerations of
the self to others. Further, apathy is contagious. Studies have found that when an individual is
placed with a control group with the instructions to demonstrate an unwillingness to be
concerned about the needs of others, the test individual will exhibit the same responses. 46 So,
when one is not motivated to care about social problems, they will also not be motivated to be an
effective solution to the problem, and they will likely cause others to follow suit. This can
exacerbate the problem of apathy and solving social problems. How can anyone intelligently
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work toward a solution to social problems without first caring about what is happening in the
first place, especially when they are motivated to do the opposite through outside factors? They
cannot. If the apathetic person, due to their apathy, cannot engage with others in this way then
they are morally blameworthy. They fail to respect others and their needs and therefore cause
harm.

Duty to Care & Duty to Reason Well
In order to avoid the harms that I have discussed above and to avoid moral
blameworthiness for our actions, we must avoid apathy. To avoid apathy, we must fulfil a duty to
care and a duty to reason well. The goal of this section is to argue that satisfying these duties will
allow us to avoid being apathetic and therefore escape moral blame for the harms discussed
above. To do this, I will first explain what these two duties entail in more detail, then I will
explain how fulfilling these duties avoids harm. From there I will then explain why a duty to care
and a duty to reason well are the two duties that we ought to fulfil to avoid apathy.
The duty to care creates the motivation to be aware of social problems and to be
prompted to action. It rests on the assumption that there is injustice in the world and that we
should do something about it. The assumption that we should intervene to reduce the amount of
injustice in the world is because we ought to care about the lives of others to the point that they
are able to access their individual freedoms. A duty to care about social problems relates to the
types of problems that cause unjustified restrictions on someone else, and that the person
experiencing these problems could have been us if events had played out differently.
The two components, awareness and motivation to action, are crucial to avoiding treating
people not as ends in themselves, but as something to gain from or to treat them as less than we

treat others. In Kantian ethics, our duties to others include a duty of love and a duty of respect.
These duties, I argue, are encapsulated in a duty to care because a duty to care means looking for
problems where others are not adequately being loved and respected. If we ought to love and
respect people, when we discover that others are not, we should not want to just sit aside and do
nothing. You cannot love and respect others if you tolerate the mistreatment of them. A duty to
care aims to establish the conduct for treatment of others that will help us to treat them as people
should be treated regardless of their stance in society, and it will help us to avoid falling into the
attitudes that will likely result in causing harm.
For Kant, our two duties for how we are to treat others are composed of a duty that is
more rigid and a duty that is more open. Our duty to respect others is more rigid, which means it
contains more of the types of actions that we cannot do to others, such as arrogance. In other
words, “respecting others requires us to moderate our own self-esteem to allow for proper
recognition of the dignity of others.”47 Proper recognition of the dignity of others, I argue,
requires us to be aware of the types of situations that may be causing them harm in some way.
The absolute minimum that this duty allows is that we at least acknowledge their struggles
because sometimes a simple acknowledgement of other’s plight is the only way to actually give
them any respect.48 When these problems that others are facing are incredibly difficult and we
are not in a position to help them, becoming aware of their problem is the first step in fulfilling a
duty to care because we begin to show others the respect that they deserve.
The second component of Kant’s duties to others is to love others. This second
component is where we are called to action on the behalf of others. A duty to love can be broken
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down into three parts, a duty of “beneficence, gratitude, and sympathetic participation.”49 These
three components essentially sum to our duty to help the plight of others because we should want
to honor past efforts that helped us, want to put the happiness of others above our own, and to
want to participate in the projects of others. Working together, these three require us to be aware
of what is happening to those around us. 50 We ought to care that there are people suffering from
harm and we should respect them enough to want to do something about it.
Therefore, a duty to care entails us being sympathetic to the needs of others. In order to
do this, we have to have an awareness of what is happening in the world to even begin to be
sympathetic. Then, from there, we can slowly begin to develop a motivation to action. It all
begins with learning to care about others in ways that are outside of our everyday lives. A duty to
care requires a certain type of reflection that will help to point us to the areas that we are
potentially missing information on what could be happening to others, and then find that we care
enough to find out more. It is a duty to respect others and to show them that they are entitled to
the same rights, privileges, and benefits. Respecting others requires that we care about their lives
and what is happening to them. Caring in this way is a form of recognition which is the very
minimal way of respecting the lives of others.
A duty to reason well is a duty to think about, reason through, and apply critical thinking
skills to the social problems we discover through fulfilling our duty to care. Reasoning well
means that the method through which people come to conclusions about social injustices that
they discover are sound and valid. There is wide disagreement about the causes of social
injustices, and it is hard to understand them when there are so many differing opinions. A duty to
reason well puts the burden on the agent to find the objective facts of the problem, understand
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where the roots might lie, and research the mechanisms proposed to solve it. Reasoning takes
critical thinking skills to assess evidence, process arguments, and evaluate the claims of others.
A duty to reason well means that it is our responsibility to make sure that we are making well
informed choices about how to think about social problems and then how we react to them.
Fulfilling our duty to care and our duty to reason well avoids harms because we are first
and foremost respecting others, both past and present. Respecting others is covered in a duty to
care, and it avoids the harms I discussed above of disrespecting the past progress that other
intelligent activists have contributed for our benefit. Further, respecting others would at least
acknowledge that we see the harms that are happening to others that way they do not go
completely unnoticed. This helps us to avoid failing to treat others as ends in themselves because
we acknowledge their human dignity is being violated and that what is happening to them is
wrong.

Objections
I will now consider several objections to the arguments that I have made above. The
objections that I will consider are on the following topics: effective altruism, individual
motivation for morality and the origin of individual obligations, and the capacity and burdens to
fulfil these obligations of moral progress. My goal in this section is to respond to potential
concerns of my arguments and put them to rest.
Effective altruism argues for the most effective use of the resources available to us, to
“make the world as good as it can be.”51 The aims of effective altruism are similar to the ones
that I have outlined for working toward moral progress. Effective altruism wants to accomplish
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goals such as “eradicating extreme poverty (which is also the UN millennium development goal),
reducing suffering of animals and preventing extinction of life on Earth,” and to do this, effective
altruists strive to maximize the effects of their contributions to these ends.52 The principle of
maximization has its roots in utilitarianism, and it seems obvious that the aim to reduce suffering
will be the flip side of the utilitarian ideal of maximizing happiness. Therefore, effective altruism
is an exercise in applying utilitarianism. Further, the reduction of poverty should be focused on
the most poor in the world, not the relative poor of our communities. 53 In short, if we are to do
the most good that benefits more people the most, then we should be targeting our efforts toward
the worst off in the world because they have the most potential for benefit.
Effective altruists would object to my argument by saying that targeting our communities
first we are not actually maximizing the good that we are doing in the world. The objection
would correctly point out that intelligent activists could likely do better if they directed their
efforts toward the worst off, and likely they would be in a better position to see more results
from their efforts. Intelligent activism pointed at the worst cases of social problems, making any
progress, would be a huge success at advancing moral progress generally. Effective altruists
would argue that my argument is privileged to remain focused on local communities because it
ignores the extreme suffering of others around the world. Additionally, effective altruism does
not require the same level of capacity or skill as my argument for intelligent activism requires,
effective altruism requires that people have a basic awareness of how to pick the most effective
causes to direct their efforts toward. In short, effective altruism appears more accessible than
intelligent activism.
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Before responding to these claims I want to distinguish my view from that of the
effective altruists because there are several points that we agree upon that it can at first glance be
misleading. Effective altruists are inherently consequentialists and they argue for a maximization
of the good. They are concerned primarily with getting the best outcomes from altruism as
possible. Conversely, I see a different set of obligations, those to our society. In my opinion, we
should strive to be effective as possible but in a way that is doing things the right way. I am
focused on the procedure with the goal of bettering outcomes. I argue that we should be honing
our skills to be effective procedurally and then from there we will be able to produce better and
better results. I want there to be an investment in the journey, in the legwork, that it takes to
contribute to moral progress. I do not want there to be an unthinking or low level of engagement
in the amount of good that we are doing. I want people to know why they are working toward
moral progress, and to be engaged in thinking critically about how they are going to accomplish
their goal. My theory is not a maximizing one because I do not think that people can be as
effective in their own lives if they are striving toward some maximization. I am arguing for an
imperfect duty to contribute to moral progress. This, I believe, leaves more room for pursuing
our own projects that allows us to take full advantage of moral progress.
Further, I am advocating for a systematic framework to follow the will hopefully result in
better outcomes for moral progress. I already noted above that I want people to do things for the
right reasons and be oriented to the right goals. It is about doing better during the process to
better the outcome, rather than solely focusing on the outcome of our actions. My duties, then,
are more of a systematic framework for engaging with others and how we make decisions about
what we ought to choose for ourselves and society. This systematic framework focuses on the
people whose lives we can directly touch through the decisions that we make. Eventually, I hope

that fulfilling these duties becomes a habitual action that we all take by training ourselves to be
predisposed to caring about the lives of others and reasoning well about the best way that we can
help them. In a way the duty to care and a duty to reason well are imperfect duties that we should
strive to follow, but they do not force moral perfection. Instead, they are something that we
ought to do in the background, they are a small sacrifice that we ought to make, and they are not
heroic or extremely burdensome for most.
My response to this objection has two parts, the first, is a response to the failure of
maximization, and the second is a response to the accessibility problem. So, while I am willing
to concede that maximizing the good that we are doing is important in trying to facilitate moral
progress, I am not willing to argue that the strict maximization of a good is what is the most
important. Part of the argument for intelligent activism is to continue the work that others have
already begun of which we are active beneficiaries. This boils down to a duty to respect others
and their projects that are inherent to their personhood. We need to reciprocate the duties that
someone sets forth for us to cultivate a better society altogether. We have duties to others that
require our engagement with their projects. 54 It is this need for the respect and engagement from
others that we are moved to action, therefore we are restricted through our relationships with
others and our own projects for how we begin to solve social problems.
The extent to which these projects are fulfilled is going to be contingent upon the
capacities of the intelligent activists themselves. It is the process of intelligent activism that I am
concerned with, so the extent to which projects can be maximized is dependent upon the activist
themselves during their own process, not generally. There must be room for learning and growth
to exercise the necessary skills of intelligent activism so that we are able to create strong moral
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progress that will be long lasting. Intelligent activism sees the ways that we are already
intervening in peoples’ lives and works to better that intervention by aiming it toward moral
progress. We cannot change the fact that in some capacity there must be intervention in our lives,
but we can change how well we do the intervention.
Additionally, in response to the maximization problem and the accessibility problem, I
argue that the community focus can be the beginning of intelligent activism. People will likely
not start out as brilliant critical thinkers or logicians. These are skills that must be learned before
we can expect anyone to be adept at using them. Intelligent activism can become more accessible
once there is an established framework in which people can learn it. It is much easier to teach
critical thinking skills in a framework that already has some success because it provides a model
for how to use these skills that are more accessible to those trying to learn them. This is because
of the nature of learning critical thinking itself, it requires repetition, it is laborious, and there
needs to be quick feedback. 55 So, by using frameworks that are already established to teach
critical thinking, those learning will be able to follow a model to repeat, will have a jumping off
point for their work, and will be able to predict feedback from past actions that are similar to
their own. It is not a classroom setting, but I think working within a system where critical
thinking has flourished before to foster moral progress is likely the best place to start to attain
some of the necessary conditions of learning critical thinking.
Therefore, the accessibility problem can be ameliorated as more and more people are able
to learn critical thinking skills and use intelligent activism. They can do this through continued
practice and commitment to learning this new skill and receiving feedback by engaging with past
issues and with one another. This atmosphere can then foster stronger critical thinkers that are
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then able to tackle more difficult problems and work to solve them. Then, once people have
learned how to be intelligent activists, they can then begin to expand their scope toward the
worst off in the world as effective agents for change. The reason that I do not argue for
compulsory education or engagement is because I think it would be too much at once for the
public. People learn and process things at different rates, so asking them to be involved with
every decision would likely cause more harm than good. Further, the enforceability of making
people do the work to become intelligent activists is low. Ideally, people ought to want to
become intelligent activists because of all of the harms they could avoid being a part in causing
and they could contribute more deliberately to bettering other peoples’ lives.
A second objection to my arguments above is that the requirements I have set forth to
avoid apathy are incredibly difficult and are heavily burdensome to actually accomplish. A duty
to reason well and to care are heavy duties because they require a wide range of skills and
precautions that are both intellectually taxing and resource draining. Additionally, some people
may simply not have the capacity to fulfil these duties due to a lack of intelligence, development,
or other obstacle. My response to this focuses on three main points: deferring to experts and goal
setting, practice, and looking long term.
Deferring allows room for some shortcuts that can solve the capacity and burden concern.
Realistically, there is not enough room in our lives for us to become experts on every important
topic that pertains to social injustices and greater policy. These duties embody a goal that we
should be striving toward in the different facets of our lives. There are going to be certain areas
that we are capable of completely fulfilling these two duties, and there will be others where we
need assistance. Where we need assistance is when we can look to others who do have the
information, resources, and capacity to understand the issues that we do not. There are some that

devote their entire lives to becoming experts on some of the policy areas that affect social
problems. So, instead of attempting to form expert level opinions on every area that could impact
social injustices, it is acceptable to defer to others who have more information or a better
understanding of the situation. It is better to defer than to make a poor choice. We can defer to
the experts to inform us on what the best procedure is moving forward to give us instructions on
how to understand these issues, and to explain to us how their area of expertise fits into and
impacts the greater scheme. A duty to care requires that we care sufficiently enough about social
injustices that we are motivated enough to do our part to work toward fixing them.
Therefore, we can still satisfy this duty by caring enough to do the legwork to find an
authoritative expert to defer to on matters that we do not have the capacity to tackle ourselves. In
this way, there is still room for us to have other projects in our lives and those with limited
capacity to use reasoning skills to find someone else to inform their decisions. This makes a duty
to care and a duty to reason well much more accessible because one only needs to do so much as
to find an authoritative source of information to make informed decisions. Our duties are
satisfied since we were motivated enough to make ourselves aware that we did not have the
capacity to make good decisions on whatever the topic may be, and that we reasoned well about
the various sources of information that we were able to defer to one that was able to reason well
about the issue itself to be an authoritative source of information for us. The point is to at the
very least, be aware of our own shortcomings and work to mediate those while continuing to
contribute to moral progress.
My second point in responding to this objection is on practice. Practicing critical thinking
and logical skills that lead us to reason well and learning how to make ourselves more
sympathetic and aware of the social problems will become easier as we do it over time, and we

will gradually become better at them. There is evidence that practicing tasks routinely has a
positive impact on performance over time. 56 So, practicing reasoning will result in a better ability
to reason well in the future. This is especially true for learning and honing critical thinking skills.
Repetition is one of the key components of learning how to be a better critical thinker, and then
become better are reasoning. 57 Further, some will need to learn how to reason well and use
critical thinking in the first place. This is where my first point about deferring to experts and goal
setting becomes important. Those who are still learning to employ these skills that allow them to
reason well will be able to begin to fulfil their duties by their motivation to care, and ability to
defer to experts so that they are not expected to know everything.
Additionally, practice does not only affect our performance when it comes to fulfilling
our duty to reason well, it also helps us to be better at fulfilling our duty to care. A duty to care is
the motivation to be predisposed to the plights of others. It is a requirement to be aware of social
injustices, where the individual fits into that larger picture, and to have the desire to do their part
to help ameliorate the problem. This skill requires us to be in touch with both ourselves and
others, to be present and to not get bogged down in the craziness of our own lives so much that
we forget about others and greater society. A way that this can be accomplished is through
practicing a type of mindful awareness of others. There is evidence suggesting that those who
practice mindful meditation are able to train their brains to be more aware of their
surroundings.58 If there is such strong evidence that we are able to change our brain chemistry at
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will, then I would argue that there is a likelihood that we can do the same in regard to bringing
awareness to the needs of others.
The third part of my response to this objection is to look long term. This third component,
combined with the other two parts of my response, can provide a fuller picture of a duty to care
and a duty to reason well. In looking long term, if we cultivate these two duties and make them
part of the mainstream process of thinking about social injustices then we will be better about
solving them. So, while the initial implementation of a duty to care and a duty to reason well will
be difficult and requires serious effort, it is likely going to get easier as time goes on. As people
learn how to better fulfil these duties they will not need to expend so much energy on them and
the benefits then compound upon themselves.
One more point on the accessibility objection is the distribution of burdens. I do not argue
that there should be more of a burden on those who are better positioned to help, though it might
turn out that way. Instead, I argue that everyone should generally want to contribute to moral
progress through intelligent activism. It is not about singling out direct beneficiaries or those
with the most to gain, it is about working to make everyone better off because we all benefit
from that regardless. Everyone, then, has some burden to contribute to moral progress and strive
to be an intelligent activist. Conversely, those that are more apt to do this might find that they
feel a greater weight to help moral progress as they are the ones that are more aware of the
problems that need their help. This would mean that as more and more people continue to
become better and better intelligent activists, the heavier their burden toward moral progress will
become. Therefore, those that are better intelligent activists will have a heavier burden that will
be lessened as more and more people join them.

Conclusion
Throughout this chapter I have been concerned about being a good citizen by adhering to
two duties. If we satisfy these duties then we are both working on being a better person by
improving on how we view ourselves in relation to others, and by learning about how we can
change our attitude to help others once we acknowledge them. A duty to care and a duty to
reason well are necessary duties we must fulfil to avoid apathy and engage well with others. An
attitude of apathy leads to harm because we fail to respect others from the past, cause undue
burdens to others, and because we take too much of a moral risk when we fail to help moral
progress. We owe others the respect of acknowledging both their past efforts and current
struggles, and to do that we need to first be motivated to care about the lives of others before we
can be moved to action. Once we are motivated enough to care, we can then begin to find
effective solutions to problems by reasoning well through intelligent activism.
Intelligent activism is non-instrumentally valuable. Within intelligent activism there are
two components that make it especially valuable, that even without helping to improve the lives
of others, it would still be worth our while to be intelligently active. The most valuable aspect of
intelligent activism is the focus on critical thinking. Critical thinking is good in itself because it
makes us better people. We are better off when we are able to have a firm grasp on the use of
logic to understand the world around us. Intelligent activism is therefore valuable because it
forces us to hone our critical thinking skills which in turn makes us better participants in the
world around us.
To bring this down to a more practical level, there are four changes that I think people
can make in their everyday lives to get closer to fulfilling their duty to care and duty to reason
well. Once people are aware that we ought to be fulfilling these duties, it becomes easier to look

for ways to address them and be aware of our potential shortcomings. Our two duties hinge on
our being exposed to a sufficient amount of differing perspectives that we gain an insight into
how others are living their lives. Thus, the first change that we can make is to seek out a more
diverse group of people. It is important to not be sucking into an echo chamber of sameness
because then we will only be exposed to the same problems and the same way of life that we
likely have. This could mean incorporating one new activity into your week, such as
volunteering in a new area and field to gain exposure to both a new problem and the people that
are facing it. The most important part of this is to expose ourselves to more diversity and get out
of our comfort zones of who we normally associate with. Further, we can engage in more diverse
discussions with those that we do interact with regularly that are like us. Having more difficult
conversations and talking about them openly can help to increase awareness of where you might
disagree with those closest to you and understand their lives a little better.
The second change that we can make in our lives is to be a better consumer of
information. If we are already making ourselves branch out and find more diverse people to
engage with, then we ought to be also finding ways that we can actually use that information in a
productive way. There is no reason to gather “data” if we cannot eventually put it to good use.
Reasoning well requires that we know where to start. This means that we need to be learning
how to evaluate sources of information. There are several ways to do this. First is that we should
all be aware of what makes a study reputable: a large sample size, replicability, etc. That way we
can understand how much we should be swayed by results in a scholarly article. Second, we
should understand which sources are known fact check themselves or are peer reviewed. By
focusing on sources that can back up the information that they are releasing, we will begin to
have a better handle on which sources have a reputation for being trustworthy and which are not.

Thirdly, we need to make sure that we are searching out both sides of debates. It is impossible to
reason well about an issue if we only have one side of the story, namely only our own. We need
to strive to be smarter consumers of information.
The third change goes hand in hand with the one above, we need to practice critical
thinking skills. In this chapter I discuss intelligent activism as having strength in a critical
thinking ability, so we should be practicing it. Critical thinking is hard to do well without
deliberate practice. In order to deliberately work on critical thinking, we ought to go back to the
basics. When we are reading articles and consuming information, we should be stopping to think
what each piece of the argument is. What are the claims? What sorts of assumptions does the
author make? How do all of these elements fit together? Asking ourselves these types of
questions will help us to be more deliberate about our critical thinking. Further, in critical
thinking the evaluation of arguments is crucial. To work on this, people could practice questions
from the LSAT, or other tests geared toward critical thinking. I am not arguing that this is
supposed to be a fun process, but that it ought to be one that can help us hone our skills. So,
taking time to do twenty-five LSAT logical reasoning questions is a quick way to gain exposure
to this.
Fourthly, we need to set smart goals for ourselves in doing all of the three things above.
The goal should be specific enough that it has direction. It should be manageable, meaning that it
is not too big nor too easy. Goals should still require discipline and sacrifice before completion,
that is the entire point. Goals should also have a realistic timeline and way to hold ourselves
accountable. So, when we are working toward fulfilling a duty to care and a duty to reason well,
we ought to challenge ourselves to set small benchmark goals toward them. This could mean
setting a goal to volunteer in a new place and do a set of critical thinking practice once a week

for six weeks. Then increasing those actions in frequency as it becomes easier and easier for us
to do. Fulfilling our duties to others is not meant to be an overnight change, but one that we work
toward consistently.

VOTING

Introduction
Now that we have looked at apathy and the two duties, we are required to fill to avoid
apathy, let us now look more closely at another practical application of these principles. The
question that I want to address now is: should you vote given that most people will be apathetic?
In this chapter I will argue from many of the same points that Jason Brennan and Chris Freiman
regarding the realities of voting.
Primarily, voters overwhelmingly tend to vote poorly. Both Brennan and Freiman argue
that since the average voter is bad at voting, there is reason to believe that instead we do not have
a duty to vote at all. In this chapter, I will explain how people find themselves voting badly, the
difficulties that voting itself presents, what the consequences and moral implications of these bad
votes are, and then I will argue that the duty to care and duty to reason well show that we have a
duty to vote. I will argue that our duty to vote requires us to vote well, and before concluding this
chapter I will explain how almost everyone can become competent voters.

Voting Badly
Voters tend to vote badly two ways: irrationally, and incompetently. Voting is essentially
the expression of a set of political beliefs, so by casting a vote an actor is submitting their

opinion for count in one direction or another. Here is the problem with political beliefs as put by
Michael Huemer: they are widespread, strong, and persistent. 59 This means that there are wide
varieties of beliefs that people hold, that when confronted with disagreement people are
confident that their belief is the correct one, and that they are unlikely to be convinced otherwise.
The nature of political beliefs tends to make actors make poor decisions when discussing issues
because they tend to block themselves off from hearing arguments from the side that does not
agree with them.60 Further, people will be unwilling to consider changing their beliefs even when
they are presented with reliable evidence that their belief is wrong. This unwillingness and
tendency to shut down during conversations perpetuates an attitude of irrationality and creates
more polarization as people stick to their guns even when presented with evidence that their
beliefs may be wrong or flawed.
Consider a different scenario, the same voter is trying to navigate their way to a new store
that just opened in town. They think that in order to get there from their house, they must take a
route that requires two lefts and a right before arriving at their destination, but their housemate,
having already been to the new store, tells them that instead it is actually three lefts instead of
two and no right turns. Any rational person would adjust and correct their belief about how to get
to the new store instead of refusing to believe their housemate. It would be irrational for the
agent to disregard the new information offered by their housemate. This scenario is common
enough, we have all found ourselves to be mistaken about some matter of fact and changed our
belief when presented with reliable evidence. What is different about politics, according to
Huemer is that voters will not change their belief when presented with evidence otherwise,
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instead they become even more adamant that their view is the correct one. 61 The store scenario is
a matter of day to day life that people do not have as strong convictions about, whereas voting is
closer to home and there is much more emotional weight put into those choices. Therefore the
former has less of an emotional cost than the latter, making it much easier for people to change.
When it comes to voting, people tend to be more focused on the content of their belief rather
than the method through which they conceived of the belief in the first place.
Even more problematic than a refusal to alter or change a belief is that a voter could hold
beliefs that derive from justifications that are contradictory to another belief justification they
also hold, which is, speaking logically, invalid.62 Voters do not usually pull their political beliefs
out of thin air, there is some form of a justification process that happens to form their political
beliefs. I assume here that when voters are forming beliefs about social or economic issues, they
begin with some type of underlying principle or principles that guide their choices. Therefore,
having contradictory justifications in reasoning seems to me to indicate that voters must not be
applying the same beginning principles to their beliefs or applying them inconsistently. There
must be something awry in the logical application of principles that lead to the good if we are
finding seemingly contradictory justifications and conclusions.
Further, voters are also irrational in how they form their justifications more generally.
Most voters use bad arguments to justify their political beliefs by attempting to take shortcuts.
They take shortcuts in various ways that often result in a suboptimal choice through heuristic
voting. There are several types of heuristics which range from affect, single factor, ideology, and
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likeness heuristics. 63 In all of these cases the voter is using one small aspect of a campaign or
candidate platform to make a sweeping generalization about the rest of their views and how they
will perform as an elected official. These short cuts make the voting decision easier, but they
inevitably result in a suboptimal choice. 64 More problematic though than just taking one aspect
of a campaign to make a decision, many voters rely on personal attributes of candidates to make
their decision. These attributes have nothing to do with a candidate’s ability to perform their
job.65 Voters, then, are not even concerned with the relevant issues in making their decisions and
justifications for who they are voting for, instead they are focused on other outside factors.
The second way that voters vote badly is due to their incompetence. Voters are ignorant
about the issues on the ballot, or they may simply not have the capacity to understand the
complex issues at hand. This is called the ignorance problem. 66 The ignorance problem is one of
the best documented phenomena in recent political science. 67 The basic idea is that it is easier for
the individual agent to remain ignorant about issues that they are voting on, than to spend
enormous amounts of time, effort, and resources gathering the appropriate information and
educating oneself on it when an individual vote is likely to be “inconsequential.” 68 In other
words, it is more beneficial to remain ignorant and enjoy the positivity that our society associates
with civil participation, than to incur the high cost of being competently informed. So, while
political beliefs may be irrational in how they are developed and engaged in discussion, the
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ignorance problem is an area where the voter is being rational. It is rational for the voter to not
want to expend the time and effort to learn everything that is necessary to understand complex
political issues when the payoff is likely to be essentially negligible.
Additionally, a country like the United States has a population of over 330 million people
which means that many of the policies and changes to the governmental system are incredibly
complex. This complexity means that many voters are not competent enough to gather the
necessary information and analyze it in a way that would allow them to reasonably come to a
solution about the vote to cast that will result in the correct policy choice. 69 In short, the average
voter is not going to be able to adequately understand the issues well enough to vote well on
them. Even the top experts on some of these issues are not reliably accurate when predicting
correct policy choices. 70 This, to me, indicates that the lay person, a non-expert, should not be
attempting to make decisions with little to no understanding of the issue as a whole when it is
likely that they will fail to make an informed choice and vote well.
Another component of the ignorance problem is that in addition to being unequipped to
fully understand the complexities of policy, the average voter may just not have the resources to
access the necessary information regarding policy issues in the first place, or they may not have
the resources to access the education to begin to learn how to approach policy issues. If a voter
does not have the ability to even gain access to the necessary information to vote well, then they
will continue to vote poorly through no fault of their own. This adds another layer to voting well
that must be addressed. Inability due to restricted access to information and resources should not
be a justifiable reason that people are voting badly.
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Lastly, when voters cast their votes, they are expressing their distinctive perspectives and
way that they view social issues. This means that voting is also a reflection of how they view the
world which can inform some aspects of how political institutions function. This information is
important because it reveals how the individual is thinking about societal issues to an extent. The
problem that presents itself when people are voting without reflection of what their vote really
means. There is a tendency to vote along party lines because voters think that one party follows
their thinking on one issue,71 which then results in them choosing to vote in a certain way on
other things based on one issue. Which, in my opinion, is not the right way to be making
decisions because it removes the opportunity to make decisions on every issue.
My question now is this: in a country as large as the United States with so many layers of
complexity to policy that impact the lives of hundreds of millions of people, should voters be
voting on issues that they realistically have no reliable knowledge about, and what should they
do about it?

Difficulties of Voting
To answer my question above, we first need to look at the difficulties of voting to
understand where these voters may be justifying their reasons for voting badly. Many of the
difficulties of voting arise from the nature of voting itself. Voting’s main difficulty is the
disconnect of individual action versus the collective change that action is likely to bring about.
The three areas where voting is difficult that I want to address in this section are the difficulty of
one vote making a tangible difference, the difficulty of convincing people to do their homework
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before voting, and the difficulty that there are much more effective means of facilitating change
outside of voting.
If I am a well-meaning voter that is seeking to create a change in my community or
country at large, the likelihood that my single vote will make a significant difference is
incredibly slim at best. Firstly, this is because most elections or referendums are won by a
margin wider than one vote. So, adding my one additional vote to either side is not going to
make too much of a difference. In fact, there is evidence that the likelihood of a single vote
making or breaking an election is as low as “one in a billion.” 72 This is because for a single vote
to make a difference in an election two conditions must be satisfied. The first is that the number
of electoral college votes has to be “necessary for the candidate to win the electoral college,” and
once that condition is satisfied, a single vote would have to break a tie in that state to sway the
electoral college vote distribution. 73 Even if those two conditions were satisfied to make that
tangible difference to sway an election, there is also a strong likelihood that a national election
that is going to be determined by a tiny margin will be taken out of the hands of the voters. For
example, during the Bush election in 2000, the votes were so close that it ultimately was decided
by the Supreme Court who would be president. 74 Therefore, it seems difficult to argue that a
single vote is going to affect any tangible difference in the outcome of a large election.
Secondly, even if every single voter was able to surpass the problems of incompetency
and irrationality discussed in the previous section, it is still difficult to incentivize voters to do
their homework to be effective and good voters. In fact, there is little incentive to do any part of
voting well. I have already discussed the weighted costs and benefits of being a good voter and
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why people tend to not vote well, but there are other reasons for the incentive to do their
homework when it comes to voting badly. Right now, in the American political climate, the
public act of going to the polls and voting is more rewarded than anything about the goodness of
the decision of the vote itself. It is easier to reap the benefits of a public praise of being out and
voting than it is to stay in and do the work required to make a reasonably informed choice. 75
After all, why do we give out “I voted” stickers on election days? And why do absentee voters
complain that they do not get them?
Researching and doing the mental work to understand complex police issues is also more
costly than choosing a button that may sound nice in the voting booth. There are a ton of costs
involved in a voter learning to vote well. There is essentially no incentive to reason well about
politics because it is not something that our current political climate values. Additionally, it is
mentally exhausting to constantly evaluate and reevaluate political beliefs through fact checking
them and listening to opposing arguments. 76 This further incentivizes people to not be good
voters because there appears to be no outward reward.
The last difficulty of voting is consequentialism. Consequentialism is the idea that we
should be choosing our actions based on maximizing the good that we can do in the world,
whatever leads to the most good consequences is the choice we should pick. The difficulty that
arises from consequentialism is that there are much better and more effective things that we
could be spending our time on than voting or preparing to vote. Instead of going to the polls I
could volunteer for an effective charity, or even donate the amount of money that I save by
staying at work instead of voting to charity. 77 Some argue, however, that if the expected utility is
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high for voting, then it may be worthwhile to spend time voting. The argument is that if I were to
cast the single vote that changed the direction of an election, then my one vote could determine
the trajectory of an entire nation for that election cycle. 78 While this is a claim that demonstrates
some of the potential benefits for voting, I think that the chances of this happening are
astronomically slim, and if it did happen, then it would be taken out of voters hands and decided
by a judicial body.79
Therefore, consequentialism poses a difficulty to voting because there are consistent and
guaranteed results from using my hour of voting to do other activities. I can directly positively
impact my community or the world every time I devote an hour’s worth of work to a cause, but I
cannot determine a guaranteed result from the marginal at best chance that I will make an
astronomical difference in a close election. It seems better to focus on being consistently
effective. If I did that, there are more tangible effects of my action that I will have more control
over than I do when I vote. It seems that if I as a citizen truly want to enact change in my
community, it is more effective to do it myself rather than attempt to facilitate change through
elected officials and legislation.

Why Bad Voting is Problematic: Moral Implications
I have discussed how people tend to vote badly due to their irrationality and
incompetence. Then I explored how the nature of voting presents its own difficulties and
obstacles for fostering good voters. Now I want to turn to assess the deeper implications of bad
voting. In this section I will examine the bad consequences that arise from voting badly, the risks
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involved in not taking due care while voting, and the moral implications of what voting badly
does to our fellow citizens.
Voting badly could result in the implementation of unjust policies or authority that harm
parts of the electorate. Meaning, that when the electorate votes badly by their irrationality or
incompetence, the policies they put in place are at risk of being harmful without anyone noticing.
When voters are not voting in an informed way, they are taking a risk on the type of policies that
they put in place because they cannot know what the result will be of their selection on the ballot
if it were to win. Put another way, when voters make a bad decision when voting, they are
unknowingly risking casting a vote for something that could have disastrous effects on others. 80
In theory as this continues, the voters could continuously be selecting policies that continue to
harm other groups without a consideration of how their actions affect the lives of others. This
seems morally unjustified to be because if a voter is going to the polls to be in charge of the
types of policy that are enacted, or the official who is going to work to serve their interests, then
it seems that a voter should know who or what they are allowing to have authority. After all, the
moral risks involved with not carefully selecting a policy are too high to chance due to the sheer
number of lives they affect.
Now, there is another consideration that we should address here: that these bad voters
could accidentally or unknowingly select a good policy. While this case is possible, I find that it
is hard to wait on an accidental good outcome instead of doing the work to ensure that there are
good outcomes. My response to this point is that it would be irrational to hope that eventually,
every once in a while, there is an accidental good choice made when there is a possibility to
increase the instances of good outcomes is attainable.

80

Brennan, “Polluting the Polls,” 539.

This idea further extends to say what we can and cannot require from others and their
actions in society. In voting, we pose a risk of illegitimately restricting one's actions for the
wrong reasons when we vote badly, and we ought not take actions that have the potential to do
this. If we have a right to something, then we can rightly require other people to refrain from
violating it. So if I have this right to freedom, then I also have the ability to demand that others
do not infringe upon it.81 To expand this further, since we live under the same democracy and are
operating in a collective capacity, then we must have some mechanism in place to determine
what course of action we are going to choose for society as a whole. The selection should ideally
be something that respects the rights and dignity of everyone involved and allows them to live
out their day to day life autonomously. So, when voting we should be doing so in a way that
conforms to this idea and striving to avoid subjecting people to infringements on their rights.
Elections that put officials in power give those officials significant influence over our
lives, they have the potential to determine the trajectory of how we live day to day. 82 Since
governmental actions that derive from voting have the potential to have a profound impact on
our lives, we want to make sure that something that has the potential to shape so much of it has
been selected carefully and properly. When it comes to my right to determine the way that I want
to live, a voting decision can illegitimately infringe upon this right. Voting badly has a higher
tendency to result in policies that will not respect these crucial aspects of life due to the lack of
consideration that we, as bad voters, put forth in electing them. It is increasingly important, due
to the magnitude of the effect that elected officials have in our lives that we refrain from voting
badly.
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We also have a moral responsibility to not cause undue harm to others. Given that voting
has the capacity to facilitate serious injustices or to continue to perpetuate standing injustice,
voting badly means that citizens could be complicit in allowing these injustices to happen. At the
end of the day, the way that democracy is set up means that citizens are at least partially
responsible for the actions of their government because they expressed their consent in who they
elected to govern them.83 This is also a collective issue. One person is not enough to resist the
injustice committed by a government. I am not capable of forcing the government to stop their
bad actions all alone. 84 If we vote badly because we do not know or are irrational, then we cannot
even begin to make headway in trying to ameliorate the injustices that are being committed. So
injustice will continue.
We cannot, in good conscience, let injustice continue because of our voting decisions.
When we vote poorly and put the wrong people or policies in power, we are effectively allowing
bad things to continue to happen. The first step that we can take towards stopping injustice is to
acknowledge that, likely, the way that we vote now is badly done, and begin to work toward
solutions.

Duty to Vote
What I have described up until this point is the problem with voting in general. I have
established that, in general, most people vote badly due to their incompetence or irrationality. Up
until this point I have largely relied on the arguments of Chris Freiman and Jason Brennan to
explain voting badly and the consequences that doing this can have on society. I agree that bad
voting is a significant problem that merits our attention and that there is a ton of evidence that
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shows that democracy might be worse than random selection.85 Given all of this evidence, both
Freiman and Brennan believe that we should refrain from voting almost entirely if we are not
competent enough.
This is where I disagree with their points. I do not think that simply because there is a
high tendency to vote badly that we should take the easy way out and not vote. I think that voting
has too much at stake and due to the way that our democracy is structured, we have a duty to
vote. It should be a priority to get as many people to vote well as possible. Leaders, then, should
be concerned with helping their followers vote well and encouraging good voting practices.
However, this is more than a leadership problem. We all have a duty to vote well, and most of us
are likely failing to fulfil this duty. We should all be held accountable to voting well, making a
difference for the better, and fulfilling our duties.
My reasoning for disagreeing with the argument that since we vote badly then we ought
not to vote at all is because I do not think that it follows that since something is done poorly or
that it is difficult that we should give up on it and stop it altogether. Voting, in my view, is the
way that we as the general public can express where we want our society to go and how we want
it to move forward. It is essentially a quasi-conversation between the public and elected officials
crafting the laws that are going to form the framework of our lives. Dropping out of the
conversation completely seems dangerous and likely will not solve the problems that we elect
officials to solve in the first place. If, morally speaking, society generally is better than it has
ever been and has made progress in the treatment of others, then it seems that dropping out of
voting would result in many people not being involved in progressing. But given that people will
not stop voting no matter how many different people continually illustrate how many problems
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that there are associated with it, there is a different question we should focus on. What should I,
as an individual, do in regard to voting? The answer is to strive to vote well.
In my last chapter I argued that the work of past intelligent activists that got us to where
we are today, their efforts and sacrifices, puts a burden on us to now continue to work toward
their goals. The same argument applies here. If in the past intelligent activists have done work to
ensure that we have the power to vote and engage in this type of dialogue with elected officials
who are making the decisions about how we live our lives, then we need to continue to make
sure that we are voting. But more than that, we need to make sure that we are voting well. We
should not be voting with irrationality or incompetence, instead we should be striving to take
advantage of our power to vote in a way that respects the past efforts of those who secured our
right to vote in the first place. To do this, we need to make sure that we are weighing our options,
making informed decisions, working to mediate against our bias, and are reflecting on the type of
society that we want to be. In voting, then, there is a moral reflection component involved. We
should be taking the time to care about the issues that we are voting on and then after that we
should be taking the time to reason well about them.
Here I am also coming from the point of view that the purpose of society is to continue
moral progress to keep getting better and better in how we treat others and ourselves. 86 If that is
the case, and I think it is, then we should be aiming our actions toward this goal. Our collective
and individual actions should reflect the aims that we are seeking to achieve. Voting is an
expression of our will and opinion on how to handle issues that affect almost everyone in some
way. With voting, we should be expressing our opinion in a way that is consistent with seeking
to improve our society. This means that voting irrationally and incompetently due to a lack of
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information will never result in our deliberate choosing of moral progress. How can a voter
legitimately decide to pursue this end if they are voting in a way that does not consider the
relevant facts, rationalize through the consequences, and derive their own conclusions? In my
opinion, they cannot. Therefore, the solution that I see to voting badly is not to stop voting, but to
make deliberate choices to ensure that we are voting well.
In an ideal world, the first step to voting well is to care about every issue that is on the
ballot. Caring about the issues on the ballot means that a voter is aware of them and is moved
enough to want to offer an opinion about them through their vote. If voters are to be oriented
toward some good or some ideal of moral progress for society, then they should care about the
issues on the ballot that are going to help facilitate or hinder this progress enough to act on them.
To act deliberately to achieve some end, someone must first care about what they are doing in
the first place.
After people care about the issues that are on the ballot and up for debate in their
communities and larger society, they then need to act on it. To act on “it” is to vote, and to vote
well there needs to be a competent level of knowledge that goes into that decision. Voting well
means that voters will know the ins and outs of the policy that is being proposed by someone
campaigning for election, know the consequences it could have, know the other areas of life that
one policy will have on others, and know where potential bias might lie. Voters, to vote well,
need to know where policy solutions are coming from, the effects they could have, who the large
stakeholders are, and how all of the different factors work together to form the potential solutions
presented to them. Further voters need to understand the concepts of the law or issues a
candidate is discussing so that when they are asked to vote in favor of what they think the best
answer is, they know which ones align with their goals the most. For example, in looking at

economic policy, the voter who votes will understand economics to a level that they themselves
could read the policy brief and understand all of the details laid out within it and could discern
what those details mean in the larger picture. Voters to vote well need to know what is going on
and what the consequences of their choices will be.
In addition to knowing the facts of policy issues, voters also need to be aware of their
own potential biases and where they could fall short. They need to be actively working to
improve themselves in how they are facilitating moral progress because if we want to make sure
that we are continuing moral progress we need to make sure that we are not inadvertently
sabotaging ourselves due to unchecked bias. We need to constantly be checking ourselves to
fight against thoughts of prejudices within our own heads to allow ourselves to be in a place to
educate ourselves on how to respect others and their needs. If we fail to realize where we might
have bias in our own minds then we will fail to recognize it externally, which could lead us to be
complicit in the injustices that we allow to be placed on others. Instead we need to ensure that we
are valuing “others as end-setters” in order to fully participate in helping moral progress.87 Once
a voter is aware of where they might be hindering moral progress in their own heads via
prejudice and has the background knowledge on every issue, then they can fulfil their duty to
vote well. Overall, once voters can check themselves and educate themselves on moral progress,
they can then work to vote well for the sake of fulfilling their duties to others. In turn, voters will
be voting well to contribute to moral progress for the right reasons.

Practical Way to Vote Well
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Now, all of the above is what I think people should do before they can vote in an ideal
world. Only in a perfect world would someone have the time, mental capacity, and resources to
fully research and understand complex policy issues as well as maintain rigorous selfexamination of their own prejudices. Most people will not have the capacity to do the former
when it comes to voting. Virtually no person is able to fully comprehend how all of the issues on
the ballot could be solved, but thankfully I believe that there is a way for people to vote well
without all of the effort that an ideal theory would require. I still believe that people will need to
be doing the leg work themselves on respecting others to the best of their ability, but I find that
when it comes to gathering information about policy issues, we can defer to experts.
One of the biggest problems in voting is that people simply do not have the ability to
fully understand all of what goes into policy, but there are people that have dedicated their entire
adult lives to studying one area. There are experts in all fields that will be able to weigh in on
how different policy areas will affect one another. In fact, these experts are frequently asked to
weigh in on what the best course of action should be for our legislators already. 88 What we need
to do, then, to begin voting well is to look to the experts that are already offering opinions on
what the facts are and how different solutions present different outcomes. Then we need to elect
candidates that will listen to what experts have said and act accordingly.
Allow me to elaborate. I do not think that it is a good idea to turn to one expert per policy
issue to determine how I should cast my vote. Rather, I think that experts provide a crucial
missing piece of the voting puzzle that could allow voters to educate themselves on complex
issues in a meaningful way. Voters should be looking to a series of experts to provide
information on what effects there could be, what alternative solutions there are, and what the root
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of the policy issue is so that they can use the information provided by experts to make an
informed choice in voting. If, for example, I do not understand what the new economic policy is
about, I can look to experts to explain to me what the policy would mean in a variety of settings
without having to have the background knowledge of an economics PhD behind me. Instead I
can look to experts to help fill in the missing parts of my understanding so that I am able to make
an informed choice in my vote.
Deferring to experts in this sense does not mean allowing one person to then dictate all of
my decisions, it is so that they are able to serve in almost a teacher-like capacity to help me to
educate myself on policy issues. It is important that when we defer, we defer to experts and not
to other forms of information. There is a ton of false information that is readily available for
consumption that can present itself as a reliable resource. Experts, on the other hand, can be
easily identified. Leaders in their respective fields are those that possess the highest degree that
one can have for their subject matter. They are also those that are able to demonstrate consistent
expertise on the issues they comment on and have expertise working in their field. They are the
people who have already been identified as those who are credible enough to teach others about
their area of expertise. These are people that are selected by the legislative branch to speak at
senate hearings, they are professors at universities or graduate schools, and they are the ones that
are leading how other experts in the same area engage with the subject matter.
Gallup, a resource for polling experts and analyzing the current big issues, provides an
easy way for people to read about what the experts are thinking on big topics. Gallup offers a
range of opinions from different players in almost any domain and presents statistics and concise
advice for how to approach topics and what we should think about when making decisions. 89 If
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people were to consult a resource such as Gallup they would have all of the necessary
information at their fingertips in seconds. They would be able to read an array and decide for
themselves what they think is the best choice that they should vote after having informed
themselves adequately. There are also other sources of information for those with more time and
resources on their hands. A student at a university, for example, would be able to access
databases of verified scholarly articles that would offer further insight and solutions to the
world’s problems in more depth and complexity. The most important characteristic about
choosing an expert is that the voter makes sure to assess their credibility by asking themselves
the questions of good traditional research design and explanation.
I also think that the deference to experts is a step in the right direction from what we have
been doing to vote badly because it moves the focus of politics to the facts of the case, rather
than focusing on the show that politics has become. It will be less about the image of the
candidate and more about the concrete solutions they are offering. People will then be forced to
think more about the content and consequences of a candidate’s platform instead of focusing on
how that candidate is coming across. In politics currently, we already defer many of our choices
to a different type of expert that informs how we ought to vote with little thought about the actual
repercussions. I am referring to voting along party lines that is undoubtedly how many voters
vote. Their party essentially takes a stance and voters will vote with their party without much
thought. Deferring to experts would be better because there would be a more deliberate choice in
how voters vote. They would have to sift through several different expert opinions to gain the
facts, and then decide for themselves the best choice toward moral progress.
One problem that is worth considering here is that it is difficult to know how to aggregate
expert opinions on how to vote in an election that chooses a candidate that has ideas to enact a

wide range of policies. This is especially problematic when the experts do not even have a
general consensus on an issue. There may be one candidate that has an excellent healthcare
reform idea that they promise to implement while their opponent has a better idea about
immigration policy. What should voters do in the case of a divided right answer when they can
only choose one? This is inevitably going to be a problem when deferring to experts because it is
nearly impossible to agree with one sweeping platform on every issue.
Practically speaking, I still argue that people should do their best to figure out their voting
decision on an issue by issue basis so that they are as informed as they can be and they are aware
of how their choice is possibly going to impact other areas of policy. It is important that voters
be more aware and get their information from better, more reliable sources before making a
decision as a matter of habit. Experts have devoted a significant amount of their life to reach
their expert status, so we should weigh their considerations more heavily than our own because
they know more and understand the issue better. 90 Further, there are likely experts who are better
than others. We have ways of knowing which experts are better equipped than others to weigh in
on a problem, such as how good a university is or the level of success an organization has had
working within an issue. Voters should then be aware of the different types of experts when
deferring to them to ensure that they are taking consensus from the best experts possible,
whenever the opportunity presents itself. Deferring to experts should then provide us with better
information and ability to make a voting decision than voting without consulting them.
When experts disagree with a candidate, though, is where I think that their personal moral
compass comes in. The most important thing is that voters manage to get away from false beliefs
that their reasoning abilities have fallen prey to in the past because false beliefs are what hinder
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our ability to make an informed decision the most. 91 In an ideal world, candidates competing for
office would change their platforms to be in line with the opinions of experts so that voters
would not be forced to make reasoning concessions, but that is likely not going to happen in the
near future. So, once voters have gathered the evidence and researched platform issues, they then
have to decide for themselves what is the most important policy issue, assuming that they can
find some consensus between a large enough portion of experts on an issue. Voters already use a
ranking system to decide what issue areas are the most important to sway their voting decisions,
and after deferring to experts and gaining a better grasp about what is at stake, they can continue
to do the same thing. This would allow for individuals to still have their own unique perspective
on policy issues while also making progress in how they make their decisions.
Voters armed with better resources and information would be able to make more rational
decisions about which problems ought to be addressed first and which can be pushed to the side
for a brief period. It is not ideal to have to pick and choose who to help and which problems
deserve attention, but practically speaking there is little other choice. For example, let's say that
after looking at numerous expert opinions, there seems to be a consensus that immigration policy
is the most dire problem that the nation is facing and that the solution seems to align with a
candidate that has a differing opinion on something that is not as pressing as immigration. In this
case, it might be worth choosing this candidate because they have the right answer on a more
pressing problem than their opponent.
Further, if voters continued to reliably defer to experts, then it could shift the way that
elected officials engage with policy options. Since we know that officials are seeking the advice
of experts after they are elected, they could do this before their election as well. There is a
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potential for experts to weigh in more on what are the biggest problems that need addressing.
From there, ballots could contain a way for voters to rank their issue areas in order of priority
and importance to them. This might result in drawing issues along party lines, but if voters are
genuinely working to be more rational and make decisions based on the facts that are presented
to them, then, after a period of time to allow voters to gain practice voting well, ballots could be
used to rank priority issues. This in turn could then hold elected officials more accountable to
solve the most pressing problems that they had the best answer for according to experts and
restrict them from implementing policies that they were not as strong on.
In gaining the facts necessary to vote well from experts, it could also be useful to make
use of people who already spend a significant portion of their time advocating and seeking to
educate the public on issues that are on the ballot, activists. Activism in its ideal sense would be
able to bridge a gap between experts and the public seeking to learn from them. If, say, people
did not have the resources necessary to read scholarly articles or other academic sources that are
published by experts that would serve to inform them on how to tackle complex issues, then
activism could help provide access to these sources. It would make voting well even easier.
What would this look like? Activism in this sense would mean several groups of
individuals who are aimed toward some goal to advance moral progress of their society in some
way. They would have clearly defined mission statements that were the forefront of why they
were doing the work that they were doing. In keeping with their missions, they would then
provide information on their area of interest through doing their due diligence in research and
vetting to provide concise and authoritative reports on their issue to the public. These reports
would be able to synthesize many different expert opinions and allow them to all be found in one
place to make it easier for the public to educate themselves on topics.

Taking this a step further, I think that the idea of intelligent activism and rational decision
making should apply to all forms of civic engagement. Civic engagement is where we are
expressing our views about what actions the state should make or refrain from making about
things in our daily lives. This has a huge impact on hundreds of millions of lives, making it
something that we should be rational and intelligent about before making decisions. Before we
allow the state to intervene and coerce others into certain behaviors or restrict their freedoms, we
should have made the decision to allow the state to do this in an informed, rational way that will
help advance moral progress.

Objections
There are several strong objections that I want to consider against my argument for a duty
to vote. The objections that I want to consider are voting is ethically discretionary, the morally
problematic component of deferring to experts, that there is no incentive for people to take the
time to vote well, and that there seems to be other, better uses for our time than trying to vote
well.
The first objection, that voting is ethically discretionary, is focused on the good that
voting can do. The argument is that voting is not something that is mandated for us to do, rather
it is something that could be good to do whenever we choose to do it. 92 Voting in this sense
would be more of a good thing like donating to charity. It is good to do occasionally, but by no
means is it something that we expect everyone to do every single time. After all, there are
thousands, if not millions, of people that do not vote in every election every time that they roll
around. The primary elections are notoriously low in voter turnout, and we still make do. If this
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is the case, then it seems that voting is an action that we are not obligated to do since our system
has worked itself out without voting from everyone who is eligible.
My response to this objection is to first say that simply because something has worked
some way in the past does not mean that it is the best way for something to happen. There is no
reason to think that simply because we have managed to achieve some moral progress in our
society with the voting behaviors that we currently have that we should continue to treat it as
something to do every once in a while. In fact, if anything I have discussed above, voting in the
way that we have been voting is certainly producing suboptimal results because we are not
voting in a way that is rational or competent. I think that when we look at the way that we have
structured the dialogue between the state and the people, we will find that voting is the largest
form of communication between them. In this way, voting becomes a key piece of how we
operate generally. If voting is the key piece of how we operate, then it becomes incredibly
important in how we facilitate moral progress at all as a society. Voting becomes the biggest and
most definitive way that we can show elected officials the direction that we want to go in, and if
we are obligated to continue moral progress then it seems that considering voting as ethically
discretionary leaves us open to failing to fulfill our duties.
Another concern that people will likely have in regard to my proposal for voting is that
deferring to experts could be problematic because in voting we are expressing moral opinions on
some issues. This would mean that, if deferring to experts that we would be allowing them to
have a huge amount of influence over our moral choices. This is especially problematic when the
goal of voting is to facilitate moral progress for society as a whole. The worry here is that when
we defer to anyone for moral choices, we take the moral decision out of the hands of the actor.
This would indicate that the choices we were making were not our own, and in fact were the

decisions of a small subset of the population. If we are deferring to a small population of experts
what is to say that they truly know what is best for us and that they have done the work to check
their own bias and to ensure that they themselves are not helping along some hugely immoral
action through their justifications.
While I do see why some would be concerned about this when relinquishing some trust to
experts to help us make these large decisions, I do not see this as being as big of a problem as
some are anticipating. If the problem was really that we did not want to defer to anyone to make
big voting decisions, then straight ticket voting would not be nearly as common as it is currently.
In fact, seven states have an option on their ballots to choose all of the candidates running under
one party all at once.93 The fact that we already defer to large, sweeping party lines to determine
how we vote in elections is evidence that we are already deferring to someone else when we are
making these crucial decisions. We are already trying to take a shortcut and simply following a
massive group telling us how we should feel and vote. When deferring to experts we would
actually be doing a better job of choosing who we are deferring to when we are voting. We
would have to evaluate the information presented to us ourselves and then make a judgement call
based on what choice will lead us to the end in question. To that end, we are making a more
deliberate choice in what we are voting for, rather than trusting a party to align correctly with
what we believe to be the best choice. If we already defer to a party, deferring to experts for
similar reasons should not merit concern.
Additionally, in deferring to experts there is no reason that I see to believe that their
moral judgements are any worse that our own. In fact, they are coming from a place with the
necessary knowledge to fully understand the moral decision that is at hand when we are casting a
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vote. Experts will better understand the stakes of making a decision and will likely be better able
to articulate them to us for our education. Further, if there is no reason to suspect that experts in
general are no worse than the average person, and if we are already deferring to those in large
parties, then it seems that it cannot be truly morally problematic for anyone to defer to an expert
to make an informed voting decision.
A third objection to a duty to vote generally is that there are no real incentives to
encourage people to vote well in the way that I have articulated. This objection is also coupled
with a fourth, that there are better things that we could be doing with our time rather than doing
the work to vote well. Voting well requires a lot of additional individual effort to educate
ourselves, find the resources, and check ourselves. If anything, there is an incentive to continue
voting badly as I described above. We actually benefit from not using the mental energy of
checking our biases and prejudices because it requires a ton of mental work to understand where
we could have been wrong in our thinking in the past. There is also no social reward for what we
are doing in private to educate ourselves toward making a good voting decision. All of these
different variables together result in there being no incentive for people to change their behavior
and vote well. Plus, all of the time that we spend trying to get ourselves to a level that we can
actually do voting justice and vote well could be spent on activities that have a much higher pay
off.
In response to this objection I argue that voting is actually pretty easy as I have
articulated in deferring to experts. Once we have a group of experts that have been vetted and
found to be reliable sources, it is fairly easy to choose how to vote. It could be as simple as
following the median opinion and voting that way. This actually could make voting even easier
than it is today for some people. Voters tend to feel that they should have some reason behind

what they choose, whether that be a party or one issue that they find one candidate to align the
most with, they still need to do some researching and thinking about what their choice is going to
be. In the earlier sections of this chapter I worked through the mental work, while irrational, that
occurs. If they were instead looking for the median expert opinion, it would be easier to make the
choice to vote than previously. Now all that they need to do is find a middle ground and pick
one. The background work of doing all of the research and triple checking to make sure that
these experts are legitimate authoritative sources on the subject would have already been done
beforehand.
The difficulty, then, is not to incentivize people to vote because voting can be similarly as
easy as it is currently with deferring to experts. The difficulty is to set up and maintain a system
that would provide that background research and expert opinion. The ease with which voters are
able to find the distribution of experts will determine how easy it is to vote, therefore, to make
voting easier the next steps would be to find a system that was able to do this. So, the objection
that there are no incentives to put in the work to vote well due to the amount of work it would
take fails because voting well by deferring to experts can be just as easy when the right processes
and systems are in place.
To address the latter half of the above objection regarding the difficulty to incentivize
people to vote well due to a low social benefit or that there are better activities that are more
worth the time that it takes to vote, I want to argue that there is a link between voting and overall
happiness. There is evidence that people that engage in altruistic behaviors will lead to more
overall happiness in their lives. 94 If voting well is going to help move toward better outcomes for
everyone, then it follows that the activity of voting would be one that can make people happier.
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Voting, in this sense, could be considered to be a public good that people are doing out of the
goodness of their hearts to show that by voting well we can increase our own happiness, but
there is another way to demonstrate that voting is good for the individual’s overall happiness.
The act of voting itself, just simply casting a vote in an election, can lead to more happiness
because of how it connects us to others.95 We want to be a part of a group, and we will be
happier when we have contributed to a group in some way. Therefore, even if we reject that
voting is a public good or service that promotes good outcomes, voting still makes up happier
overall in general. Thus, voting well is easy and it has the potential to make us happier, then we
should go vote and vote well.
Though, let’s just say for the sake of argument that being a good person and being
happier are not what incentivize people. Those are external things and what people really care
about is making sure that they, themselves, are as best off as possible, no matter the cost to
others. They are not particularly concerned with the plight of others. It is not that someone who
feels this way does not care at all about others, rather they just do not take the greater needs of
society into consideration when deciding what to do. Voting well is still something that they
should want to do. Voting well results in more optimal outcomes for everyone. So while in the
beginning it could be costly to make the switch, it would pay off in the longer run because
everything would be improving theoretically. As I mentioned in the last paragraph, it becomes a
better and better investment to invest in the common good because it results in improvements for
the individual as well. Therefore, all of civic engagement, depending on the level of involvement
based on the capacity of each person, should be done intelligently and well with the aim of
continuing moral progress.
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Conclusion
In this voting section I have laid out the problems currently plaguing voting. Primarily, I
followed the arguments of Michael Huemer, Jason Brennan, and Chris Freiman on why people
vote badly. People vote badly out of irrationality and incompetence. Voting in our society is
difficult due to the complexity of our issues for a country as large as the United States. It is
increasingly difficult to fully comprehend how to fit all of these issues together, and there is a ton
of incentive to not even try. Further, voting badly harms society in a number of ways. It harms
people by putting them at risk of imposing an unjust system of authority over them, exposing
them to undue risk, and risking compliance in a system of injustice. All of this culminates,
Brennan and Freiman believe, in a reason to stay away from the polls. I argue that their
conclusion is wrong.
I do not see the connection between something having numerous problems as a reason to
abandon it completely. I think that rather than avoiding the polls, we have a duty to vote and to
vote well. We need to encourage others to vote well and improve our behavior rather than
allowing it to continue to cause us to vote badly. The nature of democracy’s structure merits this
interpretation because voting is the most effective way for the public to communicate to elected
officials what we want out of society. We should all be striving to facilitate moral progress and
voting becomes the best way to do that. Therefore, I think that we have a duty to vote well and to
push our society to be better and better.
To vote well, in theory, we would all need to educate ourselves to an expert level on all
issues on the ballot that are of significant importance and we need to be assessing our own minds
to ensure that we are not falling prey to our own prejudices and biases. This would require a

tremendous amount of work, and likely many will not be able to achieve this level of education
for a myriad of reasons. Attaining the education level necessary for this type of assessment
before voting would require having access to scholarly resources, it would require having the
time and money to take off from earning an income to educate ourselves, and it would require a
level of intelligence that is potentially beyond many citizens due to the complexity of the system
we live within. It is for this reason that I have argued that we ought to defer to experts instead.
These experts have dedicated their lives to studying one facet of the policy issues that we should
be concerned with, and they will be able to provide the resources for us to educate ourselves
enough to vote well. Experts provide a steppingstone for us to vote well without having to
sacrifice a large portion of our lives to learning how to vote well.
As experts are able to make it easier for us to vote well, they also demonstrate that there
is a sort of division of labor when it comes to fulfilling our duties. Experts are leaders in their
field, and they are the ones that know best how to solve some of the largest problems that we are
facing. We ought to listen to them when making our decisions. But there is more than that that
needs to happen. Leaders are also in a position to do more to help us all vote well. The baseline
of voting well is to do our best to avoid ignorance and incompetence by checking ourselves.
Leaders ought to do this and help their followers be better voters. Leaders should work to make it
easier to vote well for their followers wherever possible, and they ought to also practice all of the
good voting practices that I mentioned above. It is important that leaders lead by example, in my
view, because it shows a commitment to the principles they are pushing on their followers. All
of this combined, leaders should help followers vote well, we all have a duty to vote, and engage
civically, well in a practical sense to help facilitate moral progress.

GROUP LOYALTIES
Introduction:
In this next chapter, I want to discuss group loyalties. I will make an argument against
group loyalties due to how they affect reasoning in general. To do this, I will primarily focus on
partisanship and patriotism. Partisanship for my purposes pertains to the deference to the party
system in the United States to make a voting decision. It is the way that many people use to make
a choice in voting, and it is polarizing on almost every issue area. Partisanship is one way that we
have categorized and divided ourselves to take shortcuts over forming opinions on important
issues. It is the fact that this phenomenon is so widespread and prevalent that I think it is worth
addressing. Additionally, patriotism for the purposes of this paper is the devotion to and
significant support for one’s country. Patriotism, importantly, does not have to be an active
phenomenon, but it arises when triggered in conversations or when thinking about the global
community. I think that patriotism is in some ways the broader application of many of the same
problems that face partisanship, just on a country to country scale. This deserves our attention
because the world is increasingly global and interconnected, so patriotism can influence our
foreign affairs engagement.
Before moving on I want to address the following question: what do partisanship and
patriotism have to do with voting and apathy? Well, in my first chapter I worked through
arguments for the way that we should generally try to live our lives to facilitate moral progress. I
argued that we have a duty to care about the lives of others and major issues and that we have a
duty to reason well about them to be most effective in the help or progress that we do make.
Then I turned to voting behavior, one of the easiest and primary ways that we as individuals are
able to take part in decisions that have enormous effects on our society. The sheer effect size

makes it worth participating well to move moral progress forward, and in order to effectively do
that, we need to care about the issues on the ballot, be fully informed about them, check our
biases, and likely turn to experts for help. Through voting and other forms of political activity or
civic engagement, we can accomplish the goal of living well through caring about others and
reasoning well because voting determines that trajectory that our country can take.
Partisanship fits into all of this because it is one of the main components of voting today.
It is no secret that partisanship is what determines a lot of the way that voters cast their ballots on
election days. This also means that it is going to be a challenge to voting well. Voting well
requires constant assessment and judgment on the sources that we use to make good voting
decisions, and partisanship presents an easy avenue as it works today to fall short in reasoning
well about voting decisions. There are several downsides to partisanship that prevent reasoning
well, but there are also benefits to allowing partisanship to exist within our system.
Patriotism fits briefly into this framework, as I noted before, due to the global impact our
attitudes toward our own country can have on others. Patriotism works using many of the same
conventions as partisanship because they both use group loyalties in their reasoning and decision
making before choosing a course of action. In this section, I will use partisanship and patriotism
to discuss how group loyalties can cause negative effects that we should avoid. Then I will
consider objections to my claims about the negative effects of group loyalties before turning to a
solution for how to move toward eliminating these obstacles to our reasoning and decisionmaking abilities.
A Duty to Avoid Group Loyalties
Group loyalties are deeply ingrained in our nature because we all want to have some sort
of feeling of belonging in a group. This is what builds our social identity that becomes

increasingly important to how we feel about ourselves and others in different groups. 96 Social
identity and the group loyalty that follows becomes an obstacle for reasoning because it gives us
a motivated reason to continue to side with our same group, even when this might not be
rational.97 Group loyalties then cause us to reason poorly. Reasoning well about issues requires
more than reading the news, going to vote, and depending on group opinion shortcuts to make
decisions. We need to be reasoning well outside of all of these temptations to take the easy way
out. In short, we have a duty to check what I am going to call our “reasoning blind spots” for
areas where we fall short due to our group loyalties.
Why am I particularly concerned with group loyalties? Well, for two reasons. The first is
that group loyalties are, as I noted above, incredibly interwoven into our identity that contribute
to how we live our daily lives. This makes it difficult to overcome them even if we had the best
of intentions. It also, in my view, makes them more dangerous for our reasoning because we
could fail to recognize that we are falling into the trap of motivated reasoning. Secondly, group
loyalties are something that we all experience. We are all a part of some group in some capacity
and will therefore have some type of group loyalty. Therefore, group loyalties can be
problematic for everyone and the consequences of our group loyalties on other people’s lives is
worth considering.
Further, we have a duty to reason well in order to contribute to moral progress as I
discussed in my apathy chapter. If we have that duty, then something that impairs our ability to
reason well should not be allowed to go unchecked and unnoticed. In fact, I argue that since we
have a duty to reason well, we also have a duty to not allow group loyalties to impair this ability
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in a way that severely impacts the lives of others. The way forward for moral progress is to look
for ways to reason well about decisions that impact the greater community and society, and
certain group loyalties cause us to infringe on the lives of others in a way that is unjustified.
Partisanship and patriotism are two of the main ways that our group loyalties impair our ability
to reason well and unjustly infringe in the lives of others. This is because in these two groups the
power of the state is involved in carrying out the decisions that we as a collective body
contribute to making. When we use a governmental body to coerce others into doing something
then we ought to have reasoned well through why we made the choice that we did in order for
the coercion to be justified.
Before moving on I want to address a tension in this project between group loyalties and
the duty to avoid being apathetic that I discuss in my first chapter. It would seem that in trying to
fulfil a duty to care and a duty to reason well that we might have to show a deference to our own
societies and our own groups in order to accomplish this. It would then be odd for me to
advocate against group loyalties. In this chapter, I do not mean to write that all group loyalties
are bad. In fact, there are good group loyalties. Instead, I want to argue that group loyalties cause
harm to others because of their ability to cloud our reasoning abilities. I argue against allowing
group loyalties to make us cause more harms or allow more risks. There is a way that group
loyalties can be used to do good, to cause us to care more about others, or help us to be prompted
to reason well. Group loyalties that prevent us from contributing to moral progress are the ones
that we ought to be the most concerned about when making decisions that will significantly
impact the lives of others.
Group loyalties that are tied to our identities can also help us to be better if we want to
associate ourselves with the type of people that want to facilitate moral progress. These sorts of

groups arise from our commitments to other principles.98 Good group loyalties stem from our
desires to be a good person. For example, a person that is committed to being the type of person
who does not lie, then as they are challenged by others to tell a lie, will see their resolve
strengthened.99 Here, group loyalty to being the type of person that does not tell a lie caused the
person to do something good, namely not to lie. So in this sense there is a way that group
loyalties can help us to do better. The difference between good group loyalties and bad ones are
the types of behaviors toward which they are aimed and the outcomes they likely produce
because of this behavior.
In the following sections I want to look at partisanship and patriotism to expand on how
they are group loyalties and how they both feature negative consequences when it comes to
reasoning and general group functioning. My goal in doing this is to demonstrate that
partisanship and patriotism are preventing us from reasoning well which further prevents us from
fulfilling our duty to help facilitate moral progress, therefore we should be inclined to not be
partisan or patriotic.

Partisanship
The biggest problem that I find with partisanship is that it detracts from reasoning well
and it causes motivated cognition. Partisanship is one of the “most powerful forces structuring
opinion formulation,” which allows voters to take shortcuts to making decisions that have huge
implications on the lives of others in a way that is predetermined by a particular party. 100 In
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short, the decision, through loyalty to a particular political party, is determined not by the
individual but by their group affiliation. This in turn makes it easier for individuals to remove a
sense of personal responsibility when making decisions about the lives of others. It seems to me
that to take such a low level of care is morally wrong given the weight of the decisions that are
made through who we elect into office. In fact, partisanship can actively work against the
reasoning well that I have been advocating for because of its increasingly divisive nature. These
combined factors show that group loyalties can have serious repercussions on our decision
making and reasoning abilities.
The primary reason that partisanship is so prevalent is that it is easier. It is easier to
surround yourself with people who think, talk, and act as you do so to not challenge any of your
opinions. In fact, most people actively do this and avoid conversations where they are aware that
they will be met with disagreement. 101 In this sense, partisanship allows people to expend less
mental energy researching and forming opinions, and it allows them to identify other groups of
individuals that they may steer clear from or avoid deeper conversations in order to not face a
challenge to their beliefs. People congregate with like-minded groups in their closest
relationships where they will have similar opinions and avoid groups that do not share these
opinions.102 To sum up, people are social creatures. Social creatures want to fit into their groups
and will take cues from their behavior rather than risk social ostracism.
Partisanship, then, adds another layer of obstacles to reasoning well because it is tied to
our identity and brings in group bias because of how humans operate. Our loyalty to our political
group is one of the most difficult biases to overcome because it is so central to our social
identity. Social identity is how we think of our group and what is best for only the ones that we
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associate ourselves with and not always think of others that are in this wider group with us.103
Studies on social identity have revealed that when participants were asked to identify aspects of
their social identity they demonstrated how strongly they protect their groups and dislike others.
It is ingrained in our nature to look for negatives in a group of which we do not claim
membership and to seek out positives for our own group because it helps to elevate our own selfesteem and feelings about ourselves.104 It is a natural part of how we divide ourselves and protect
our self-esteem.
We continue this phenomenon with group loyalty to parties, causing us to further shy
away from engaging with the other group because it causes us to engage with a group that we
already see negatively. We are motivated in our reasoning, then, to not hear the other side and
come to conclusions we have already reached because of our group loyalty and its relation to our
social identity. It is easier to think about the people and issues that are most salient to us, and it is
much more difficult to reflect on what may be best for the whole when we live in a country that
is so large, complex, and diverse. In short, we want to stick with our groups and with our
arguments because they are part of this social identity that is important to us.
This can be problematic when we start to look at what actions this behavior turns into,
voting, activism, and other forms of political involvement. Studies of voter demographics have
shown that the most consistent group to visit the polls on election days are older, white
professionals. These groups are also the least likely to engage in discussions with people from
other sides of issues and of differing opinions. 105 Additionally, studies that examined the
likelihood of discussion about differing political views found that voters in general are likely to
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only engage in political discussions with people with which they have a higher connection. 106
The effect of this behavior is that increasingly people are not seeking out differing outlooks and
are increasingly putting themselves in an echo chamber of their own perspectives because they
are only talking with people that they know will agree with them. The most consistent voters are
the ones that are having the least diverse discussions and are the most predisposed to motivated
reasoning. Partisanship empowers the most consistent voter to use motivated reasoning to make
decisions about what is on the ballot instead of reasoning well.
The group loyalty that derives from partisanship forces people to make decisions on a
group basis instead of using reasoning and logic. Contained within our social identities there are
social costs that are associated with going against the group opinion, which in turn then causes us
to use motivated reasoning to support the group opinion as a “defense mechanism” against these
potential social costs. 107 This means that our decision making capacities are clouded by these
phenomena and we will be inclined to not only agree with our group, but will also be inclined to
put up defenses for reasoning well about issues when we get an inkling that we may be wrong.
Partisanship also causes voters to defend their group, sometimes to an extreme, to avoid
the blow to their social identity by refusing to see another opinion or increasing hostility. Studies
have shown that partisanship makes people partial to the information that is coming from their
own party,108 so it makes it more difficult to motivate them to seek out information on both sides
and evaluate them fairly. Additionally, other studies have shown an increase in racist mentalities
due to increasing partisanship. Over the past decade, these studies of group tolerance have
demonstrated an increase in intolerance and hostility from whites toward other minority groups
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and an increase in the level of hostility with which they regard minority groups. 109 This, in turn,
increases the polarization between parties, fostering a stronger sense of “us versus them”
mentalities, which then results in more gridlock between the two sides as they fight for control
over one another. Then, the part of our social identity that motivates us to find fault in other
groups kicks in and we begin to make decisions from a position of motivated reasoning to protect
ourselves and our egos.
Partisanship, then, appears that it will prevent us from exercising a healthy amount of
open mindedness. Open mindedness is hindered by partisanship because of the reasons that I
listed above, and when we do not practice open mindedness we will find that we reach
suboptimal conclusions.110 Partisanship in this way could be causing us to select worse policies
than we would if we were forced to be open minded about the decisions we were making.
Instead, partisanship seems to make it incredibly easy to not consider the other side, and not only
that, but to refuse to consider the other side with confidence. It not only means that we do not
think that there are multiple answers to one policy question, but that we think that the other side
is consistently wrong. Not that they have a different answer, but that they are completely wrong
about it.111 This seems irrational to me. The likelihood that not only is my side correct, but the
likelihood that the other side is completely wrong seems too low to be a rational way of making
choices. This is where open mindedness is necessary. We need to stop thinking of one side as
those that cannot ever make the right decision and think of it instead as a different decision.
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Partisanship, when it encourages us to close ourselves off from others, encourages us to
not care about all others. Partisanship makes it easier for us to feel justified in not considering
and caring less about the other side because we can write them off as having consistently making
the wrong decision or as not knowing how to make a decision at all. It is not uncommon to hear
phrases thrown around about how one side or the other is useless, dumb, or incapable of making
a decision because they are clouded by some delusion or another. 112 This aspect of partisanship is
likely caused by the increasing need to prove that the other side is wrong and to push people
closer to their own sides to create more party unity. The cost of this behavior is a lower incentive
to genuinely consider the arguments of the other side because we are starting from a perspective
that they are already wrong. We are not ever going to have constructive dialogue or open
mindedness if this is the attitude with which we are approaching the discussions about the future.
To tie partisanship back to voting behavior, there has been a rise in recent years of the
partisan voter. The partisan voter has shown an increase in intolerant mentalities, a decrease in
group cohesiveness, and a decrease in effectiveness more generally. In my last chapter I noted
that one way that voters vote badly is to vote using different types of heuristics. Partisanship is
another heuristic that voters are using to make decisions when casting their votes. My concern is
that this mechanism for determining how one should vote is irrational and actually leads to bad
consequences. This voting behavior results in voters voting poorly rather than working toward
them voting well.
If partisanship is breeding intolerant mentalities, then it is breeding another layer of
irrationality when it comes to making decisions. When I discussed voting, I argued that people
must vote well rather than simply vote at all. If a tool that people are using to decide how to vote
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on certain issues has been proven to foster immoral thoughts about others in the group, then
partisanship cannot lead to voting well because it will cause people to vote on issues in ways that
harm others. My claim here is that if a growing number of people are experiencing a heightened
sense of us versus them and a heightened sense of hostility to the opposing side, then they cannot
make a good voting decision because their logical reasoning will be clouded by this bias. This
then, results in bad voting, and bad voting is morally blameworthy. Therefore, we should avoid
partisanship in the way that it contributes to these negative mentalities and increasing division
between groups.

Patriotism
Now, to discuss patriotism. Patriotism has many of the same characteristics of group
loyalties that I addressed for partisanship. In this chapter, I am mainly concerned with what some
experts have called “blind” or “uncritical” patriotism. Uncritical patriotism is “an unwillingness
to both criticize and accept criticism” of a country or its leaders.113 Other forms of patriotism that
fit into a similar mold are symbolic and national pride patriotism because they too include some
inability to rationally reflect and criticize a country or its leaders. These ideologies also show
hostility to any other groups that do not have the same adherence to their support of their
country.114 This aspect of group loyalty to one’s country is rooted in not reflecting and analyzing
the types of policies enacted by legislatures and actions taken by leaders. In this section I want to
show how patriotism has negative effects on our ability to reason well due to our group loyalty to
our country. To do this, I will examine first how patriotism is tied to our social identities to
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explain why it is so deep-rooted, then I will expand upon the negative consequences that
patriotism causes, and finally I will turn to potential benefits to patriotism.
Social identity is the idea that we have group identities that we are aware of and have
certain associations because of our membership within a particular group. In this way, we have a
national identity that is one aspect of our social identity because we are aware of our membership
within a nation and because we have associations and other attachments to our membership. 115 In
short, we all know that we are Americans and we have an association to our country through
some other means, such as where we live, flying the American flag, or engaging in civic
activities (such as voting). It is these group associations that lead us to include them within our
own social identities. Patriotism causes us to show our support for our American systems and
leaders without necessarily agreeing with every single action they take. Importantly, this national
identity is not contingent upon “an endorsement of a specific political ideology” or set of
policies.116 In short, we do not need to all think the same way to be patriotic, but we do have to
associate ourselves within the same broader group, although our association to this broader group
does carry some common ways of thinking that may not be the best for our reasoning capacities.
Patriotism causes us to have part of our social identity tied to our nation, which creates a group
loyalty surrounding the actions of leaders and the direction of the country.
Here, I think that it is important to note that patriotism in this way is associated with
groups that tend toward forcing the maintenance of the status quo and tradition. 117 However, we
are all subject to feelings of patriotism, regardless of where our political ideology falls.
Patriotism is not only a form of identification with a group, but it is also a mechanism to satisfy
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some of our psychological needs. It establishes a sense of belonging by creating a sense of “we,”
which is something that humans inherently need. 118 In this sense, patriotism carries a significant
amount of power because of its ability to bring people together and give them a sense of comfort
from being within a group. We are all going to need to feel that we belong and are secure in our
memberships on some level.119 It is for this reason that patriotism is dangerous because it can be
used to sway group members perceptions and abilities to reason well.
If patriotism causes people to be less inclined to criticize and accept critiques of both
their actions and those of their leaders, then it lessens their ability to reason well about issues
related to policy of their country. This, I argue, causes them to fail to sufficiently see and care
about the lives of others and fail to reason well about problems in their lives because they will be
hindered by a subconscious association with a country. It seems, to some, that if we were to
object or criticize the doings of officials or the systems in place, that we would be unpatriotic,
and therefore against the group that provides such comfort to us in our belonging. 120 Patriotism
in this sense is used, then, to “regulate speech, behavior and acceptable positions” within the
context of group membership. It is used to say that anyone going against the grain is therefore
against the country and that this kind of behavior is unacceptable. 121 But should we tolerate this?
Is this a good idea when hundreds of millions of lives are at stake? To refuse to engage in a
dialogue about what is wrong because it goes against a group norm? I would argue that no, we
should reassess patriotism and its effects on our lives. In this sense patriotism is used as a
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mechanism to dissuade people from using other reasoning capabilities and to potentially question
the status quo. Patriotism is then used to stifle good reasoning in a way.
Before moving on I want to address some weaker claims about patriotism. There are also
more modest claims that patriotism or nationalism should have some influence on policy-making
decisions and political behavior. Instead of being a guiding factor in a decision, this claim argues
more that it provides motivation to put effort into policy decisions or a way to think about some
of the policy options. I want to argue that patriotism in this sense is not a great way to make
decisions either. If patriotism was used as an influencing factor in earnest when making policy
decisions, then we would not see nearly as much division because if people were allowing their
pride or care for their nation to make a decision then the decision would be more aimed at what
is best for everyone on balance, not what is best for them. I think that patriotism, even when used
modestly, is used as a cop out to use better more rational arguments for making a decision. There
is likely going to be a better way to argue for the same points that provides a better foundation
for a logical argument than appealing to even weaker claims about patriotism. Instead, the more
moderate claims about patriotism ought to refer instead to community obligation to those that are
closest to them.
But what specifically does patriotism do? Patriotism causes us to be more closed off from
differing opinions and asserts group dominance to crush open mindedness and healthy discourse.
An article in the Washington Post calls the patriotic mindset, “patriotically correct.” In being
patriotically correct one appeals to “a full-throated, un-nuanced, uncompromising defense of
American nationalism, history, and cherry picked ideas,” and adheres to the idea that everything
that is wrong in America can be fixed by just being a little bit more patriotic. 122 Patriotism in this
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sense is the use of the appeal to a group membership to quash the open discussion and critique of
the status quo. People appeal to patriotism, or rather accusing people of lacking in patriotism, as
a weapon in the public sphere to show that not only are their ideas wrong, but they are antiAmerican in some way. Patriotism, then is used to stifle discussion and attack opponents through
ad hominem attacks instead of healthy discourse.
Outside of attacking people using patriotism when they are opting to critique the status
quo or the actions of leaders, patriotism as a defense mechanism causes people to reason
incredibly poorly. It seems that those who are patriotically correct cannot apply the same
principles across the board on policy issues, causing their attacks to not only be off the mark but
also irrational. Take poverty in America. It seems that the patriotically correct are quick to blame
economic dislocation and expanding global markets for the poverty that poor white Americans
are facing, but cannot apply the same reasoning to other minority groups.123 It is this inability to
apply the same reasoning to a problem to different ethnic groups in the name of patriotism and
bolstering the American identity that leads to a huge failure in reasoning. Patriotism in this sense
leads people to falter in their reasoning because when addressing these issues, they are motivated
to champion their patriotism over logical reasoning due to how important patriotism is to our
social identities.
When patriotism becomes a driving force for how a large portion of a population reasons
through issues, group dominance emerges. National pride can lead to “ethnocentric and
xenophobic regard for others” in societies that operate on a “strongly hierarchical social
system.”124 The United States is one of those societies that operates on a very strong social
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hierarchy. Our social system was established by “military conquest and the subsequent
subordination” of minority groups that still persists.125 This means that in the minds of these
groups, there is one group that is dominating the others, and that group is going to feel stronger
ties to patriotism because it is easier to feel good about being a member of a particular group
when that group is dominating over others. Which, in turn has led to increased racism in white
people.126 Studies have found that increases in feelings of patriotism are related to, not only
higher levels of hostility from white Americans, but to feelings of group dominance and more
feelings of ownership over one’s country. 127 This is problematic because first, it is wrong to
foster these types of attitudes toward others, and secondly because group dominance causes the
interests of the minority groups to be overlooked and cast aside of the prevailing dominant group
decides the direction of the discussion. Meaning, that there is no way to reason well through
issues because one or more sides will not take other sides seriously in discussions.
All of this combined to me says that patriotism, like partisanship, is incredibly
problematic for good civic engagement and voting because our group loyalty that underlies both
of them causes us to fail in our reasoning in some way. It is difficult to vote well on issues when
one is experiencing the psychological pulls of patriotism and when patriotism is causing some
groups to feel more shut out of the conversation. To me, our group loyalty to patriotism clouds
our ability to think critically and use our reasoning skills to understand how to vote well and
make good, justified decisions.
It is, then, wrong to let group loyalties have such an influence on our decisions when they
are about the lives of others. Group loyalties that use the power of the state to accomplish their
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ends, like partisanship and patriotism, should not be used. If we ought to be striving toward
moral progress through intelligent activism, which is the use of logic and critical thinking, then a
distortion of our reasoning abilities does not allow us to make deliberate decisions toward
bettering the lives of others. Group loyalties, since they place such an emphasis on privileging
our own groups, do not allow us to fulfil a duty to care or a duty to reason well. We cannot move
toward caring out the lives of others to the point where we are motivated to help them if we are
stuck thinking that it is okay for one group to be better than the other simply because we hold
membership in one.
A duty to care requires that we search out the other sides and work to empathize with
them to understand what obstacles they are facing and how we can help them. Group loyalties
such as partisanship and patriotism give us an excuse to write off the other side’s problems as a
manifestation of their own doing. It does not force us to recognize that there are problems that
we could be part of for other people, instead it allows us to shy away from these discussions.
Making it socially acceptable to not engage and remain deliberately ignorant. If we are going to
elect officials to make changes in our lives that coerce people to behave a particular way, then
we ought to have made those choices ethically and with a clear mind instead of taking shortcuts
that are logically bound to fail because of how they distort our thinking.
The nature of political participation carries risk of harming others because of how
associated group loyalties can distort our thinking. As I noted above, there is a higher risk of
tension between groups, a decreased willingness to hear the other side, and a general decrease in
group cohesion when we allow group loyalties to influence our decisions about how the state
should operate in our lives. These decisions are not ones that we should take lightly, and that is
part of the reason for the increased tension and hostility between groups, but we should also be

aware of the risks we may be imposing on the lives of others. When we fail to see all sides of the
equation due to our group loyalty, we can make things worse off for everyone involved
unknowingly. Since we are not aware of what the other options are and other facts that should be
taken into consideration because we are focused on our memberships, we cannot make an
informed decision about what is best for us and for everyone else. In this sense, we should not let
group loyalties distort our thinking because they can undermine even our own objectives.

Objection
I have spent the last two sections examining the negatives and detrimental consequences
of partisanship and patriotism as group loyalties, but there are some benefits to group loyalties
that deserve to be addressed as well. Primarily, group loyalties do have various benefits that have
kept them around all this time. In this section I will consider the strongest objection to the claim
that the duty to avoid being partisan or patriotic is not outweighed by other considerations.
The main objection to my argument against group loyalties is that they are necessary for
community and group mobilization. The point here is that our society is structured around mass
involvement, and group loyalties that facilitate that are a good thing. Therefore, even if there are
negative consequences to having group loyalties that cause us to reason poorly, they are still
good on balance. This makes group loyalties and all that comes with them justified overall and
we should not be as concerned with the negative effects that they may have in cases like
partisanship and patriotism. Afterall, if we did not have group loyalties, then we would have
much less to work with in terms of facilitating moral progress.
In response to this objection I argue that the reason they are more problematic than their
potential benefits is because it is wrong to allow group loyalties to influence us and how we live

when using the coercive power of the state. When we are operating and making decisions on the
basis of our loyalty to our political party or to our country, we use the government to enforce our
views. Partisanship and patriotism are inherently the way that we view how the state should
operate, which impacts the lives of over three hundred and thirty million people. This alone is
enough to warrant careful consideration of the types of people we put in power and the attitudes
we deem acceptable in our treatment of others. When we are basing our decisions on group
loyalty in this way, they cause excessive moral risk, and it is wrong to use the coercive power of
the state in a morally risky way.
To put this to an example, think about refugees in the United States. There is evidence
that in the long run, allowing more refugees into the country and allowing them to start their
lives in our country is in the USA's best interest. On almost every empirical scale, allowing
refugees the opportunity to thrive here is better for them and for us. They create jobs, stimulate
the economy, and enrich their communities as a whole. 128 They do not drain welfare resources or
have a higher likelihood to commit a crime. 129 Fleeing violence does not discriminate, it affects
everyone in the area. Meaning that refugees are largely like us and just as capable of benefiting
our communities. From this evidence alone the United States, if reasoning well, should be
willing to allow a large number of refugees into the country to provide a safe place for them to
rebuild their lives. Unfortunately, that is not the case.
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Over the past decade or so, the number of refugees that have been allowed into the
country has drastically declined. 130 Why? The answer is due to group biases that come from our
social identities and group loyalties. Refugees come from a group that is foreign to us in the
United States, and it is therefore hard for us to look at the facts and reason from them what we
should do. Instead, many Americans fall into their motivated reasoning traps that allow them to
see refugees as “other” and as an “outsider” that will not be able to acclimate to their culture and
society.131 This causes them to not want to allow refugees into our country, even though
everyone involved benefits from their entry on balance.
Now, refugees have not only had to flee their homes due to the threat of violence, but
they are also met with nowhere to go. Due to policies such as “metering” and Migrant Protection
Protocols, less and less people are allowed to even begin the process of gaining entry to the
United States. Instead, they are forced to wait on the opposite side of the U.S.-Mexico border
where they are exposed to the same violence and crime that caused them to flee in the first
place.132 It is policies like this that have put thousands of lives in danger and have caused people
to live for years in despicable conditions in border towns. Group loyalties caused us to allow the
state to force people into this situation instead of helping them escape the violence against their
lives. Group loyalties when using the coercive power of the state allowed us to not only mistreat
other human beings, but also caused us to make a decision that is worse off for every party
involved because of our own preconceived notions and biases.
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Therefore, I would argue that the benefit of mobilization for communities is not enough
to outweigh the consequences of group loyalties when there are situations such as the refugee
crisis that emerge. The refugee crisis is an example of why we should not allow group loyalties
to distort our thinking. It makes the situation worse off for everyone involved. The refugee case
shows that when a powerful group is able to sway the way that the state operates without first
caring about the lives that they are putting at risk and reasoning well through all of the facts from
both sides, they can actually make themselves worse off along with other groups. If group
loyalties have this kind of power over our decisions, that we would be willing to make ourselves
worse off to hurt another group that is unfamiliar to us, then we ought to be actively working to
combat them. This is a risk that we should not accept in our decision-making process.
Conclusion
Now, it remains to be said what to do about group loyalties. In this section I will first
explain what I think should be done in an ideal situation to combat our group loyalties so that we
are able to reason better. In this section I will outline what I think we should do in an ideal world,
and then offer more practical solutions to making progress on how we interact with group
loyalties.
Given everything that I have considered thus far about group loyalties pertaining to
partisanship and patriotism, I am inclined to argue that we should be actively working toward
eliminating it from our system entirely and work toward finding ways to combat it within
ourselves. We know that group loyalties are inherent in our nature, but it does not necessarily
follow that we then have to allow them to dictate what happens in the lives of others. In fact, I
would argue that since we know that we have this potential for problems it would be
irresponsible to do nothing about it. Now that we know that we are predisposed to impairments

in our reasoning due to social identity and group loyalties, we have a responsibility to actively
combat them to move toward better reasoning abilities.
In an ideal world people would not need to group themselves together by some sweeping
set of stances on issues or on the basis of their citizenship, instead they would be able to take a
more involved approach to consider every issue on the ballot and every elected official before
making a decision. In an ideal world, partisanship and patriotism would not be a necessary
motivator to civic engagement because people would not succumb to the temptations of their
social identity and to take short cuts that the party system allows. They would, instead, be more
inclined to check their group identity biases and confirmation biases before making decisions. In
this case, then, ideally, we would not have partisanship or patriotism at all because it is irrational
to rely on a group opinion to explain an individual’s stance on a wide array of disparate issues.
Therefore, in an ideal world people would be aware of where their motivated reasoning steps in
and causes them to make irrational decisions based on identities and loyalties, and instead of
allowing those influences to triumph they would work to combat them through careful evaluation
and fact checking.
So, ideally, we would be able to work toward ridding ourselves of the major reasoning
failures, but more practically I am aware that this is a long way off. Right now, I think that the
best things that we can do to work toward reasoning well and moral progress is to first be aware
that our group loyalties and social identities that accompany them are doing work in the
background of our reasoning. Once we are aware that this is a phenomenon and that we are all
susceptible to falling short, then we can do the mental work it takes to assess our decisions. In
that way we will be creating a demand for more fact checking, better reporting of issues, and
giving political parties responsible for much of how people consume information less powerful.

Instead, the system would pivot to focus on issue areas specifically, there would be less ability
for political parties to cover all of the subjects because we would be demanding more from them
as far as spelling out their plans and verifying their claims. There would be more of an emphasis
on what the facts are telling us to consider rather than considerations of who is presenting the
facts to us.
Shifting the focus from who is doing what and highlighting group divisions will give our
subconscious dependency on group loyalty and divisions less power, and therefore less hold over
our thought processes. We can reason better when we work to minimize the considerations that
used to lead us astray, I argue. This then would allow us to continue to make more and more
progress toward combating the distortion of our reasoning capabilities and facilitating more
moral progress.

CONCLUSION

I have just worked through my arguments that are aimed at explaining how to better
engage civically. Bettering civic engagement begins with fulfilling our duties to others in how
we ought to behave in our communities. The type of action we take, deliberate or not, matters,
and we should strive to maximize the amount of good deliberate actions we take. Primarily, this
means working toward moral progress by not falling into an attitude of apathy. We need to take
care to avoid apathy by fulfilling a duty to care and a duty to reason well so that we are able to
participate in deliberately moving moral progress forward. As the beneficiaries of past moral
progress, we ought to be the ones to continue to move it forward so that others in the future are
able to be included. The way that we should then be engaging in our communities should be
aimed at this goal with considerations of how to fulfil duties in mind when making decisions.
The best way that we collectively take deliberate actions that are going to help facilitate
moral progress is through voting. Voting is not only an expression of what the public wants, but
it also reflects the type of actions and officials that we deem acceptable. Most importantly,
voting and the choices of the representatives voting selects, are responsible for how people are
able to live out their daily lives. It is through casting a vote that we enable the state to make
decisions on our behalf and intervene in the lives of others. Not only should we be worried about
non deliberate and deliberate actions, but when it comes to voting we should also be worried
about making the wrong deliberate action and causing more problems instead of working to
alleviate them. That is one of the current problems that plague voting, voters are voting
irrationally. They are not reasoning through how to solve issues on the ballot for a myriad of
differing reasons. In addition to irrationality that causes voters to misstep when thinking about

their voting decision, they also are incompetent when it comes to understanding how the
different solutions proposed by different candidates will work themselves out. The United States
system serves over three hundred million people, making it incredibly large and complex. There
are people who invest their entire lives into studying one aspect of the system, and they
sometimes have trouble figuring out policy solutions.
The irrationality and incompetency of voters leads me to the conclusion that instead of
trying to vote as they normally would, voters should shift their focus to voting along the lines of
expert opinion. In my voting chapter I call this deferring to experts. If there are people who have
spent their entire lives working toward understanding as an aspect of our system to the point that
they and their peers feel that they are competent enough to weigh in on it and offer advice, then
voters should want to heed it. Voters do not need to do this blindly though, they ought to
consider several expert opinions and then decide which is the solution given the types of
arguments and considerations each expert has presented. The pushback on this idea is that I, as
the voter, do not want to be giving up my power of decision to a set of experts. They may all
swing to a certain ideology or have biased interests that come into play when they are offering
their opinions and that seems risky when we consider how important voting is to the future of the
country. But there is no reason to believe that experts are any less likely or equipped to choose
the right thing, in fact, they are better positioned to choose better because they have a better
grasp on the subject matter. Deferring to experts in order to better understand the issues at hand
and make a better, more informed, deliberate action is a way to vote well.
The worry about how experts might taint their opinions when delivering them to the
public comes from our group loyalties and our innate refusal to abandon them. Group loyalty
comes from our social identity. Social identity is the part of our identity that we gain from our

membership within a particular group. Importantly, our social identity is closely held, and we put
a significant weight in maintaining our good feelings about the groups that we share
membership. We look for ways to make our groups look better compared to other groups, which
influences the way that we assess and digest information that is presented to us. This means that
when we are asked to make a voting decision, we are looking for cues for how to decide along
the lines of our groups. Partisanship is the driver of this behavior. Partisanship causes us to want
to vote along party lines and adhere to the types of policies that our party is dedicated to without
much more assessment of what those policies would actually do.
Partisanship causes people to refuse to see the other side of the equation which stifles
reasoning skills. If we come to the discussion already assuming that the other side is wrong about
something, then we are not going to be open to hearing their points with an open mind and
genuinely consider them. It is wrong to allow our group loyalty to get in the way of evaluating
the claims on both sides of a discussion, and it is wrong to allow our group loyalty to make us
irrational decision-makers that could result in worse choices for the whole. Further, partisanship
is not alone in how this works. Patriotism also has a similar effect on how we engage in
discussions about issues that reach beyond our lines drawn on a map. What these group loyalties
do that is particularly harmful is that they use the power of the state to coerce and intervene in
the lives of others in a way that can limit their freedoms and cause harm. Group loyalty to a
cause that has the ability to affect the lives of others in this way must be carefully evaluated and
checked before coming to any decision.
Overall, the goal of this thesis was to offer a better way to be civically engaged because
the way that these issues allow the state to intervene in our lives needs to be examined carefully
to ensure that we are making choices that help moral progress continue and improve the lives of

others. In this thesis I do not make attempts to lay out what the decisions toward moral progress
should be, instead I wanted to explain that the way that we approach issues related to civic
engagement need reassessment and improvement. Now, this thesis could serve as a framework
for how to approach these topics in a more deliberate and rational way that is more likely, in my
opinion, to lead to an increasing amount of moral progress.
With the 2020 election fast approaching, I have been thinking of ways that I can
implement the arguments that I have made in this thesis in my own life. I know that most of the
problems that I covered in this project are not going to change overnight, and that the amount of
effort that are required to fulfil all of these duties will not immediately be filled due to other
restraints, but I do think that there are some small changes that can happen right now to get on a
better path than before. There are changes that can be made for the arguments in each chapter.
To avoid apathy and work toward fulfilling my two duties to others, I can start to be more
engaged. Paying more attention to the types of problems that other people are facing and
speaking out about can go a long way. Caring about the lives of others can start by paying more
attention to the issues that they are the most passionate about and affected by. To do this, I
should be reading the news to find out what issues are going to have the biggest impact in the
next election cycle. Another way to do this is to even take to social media to see what types of
posts people are making, assuming that I have a diverse enough group of people that I follow to
give me a good enough sample. I can also make a point to learn about the lives of others who are
completely unlike myself which would allow me to gain a more diverse insight into the problems
that different groups are facing and not just the groups that are the closest to me.
Then, I can do my homework and due diligence to research, fact check, and learn as
much as I can on a handful of these issues so that I am better equipped to make a good decision

about how to vote in upcoming elections and how to be a better ally generally. After learning
about the problems that are hurting others in my community, I am in a better position to see ways
to help them. I cannot begin to help others and care for them if I do not know where or what to
look for in the first place. The key here is that I should pick some issues to take a deep dive into,
not all of them. Trying to tackle all of the problems that others are facing because I care about
their lives is not a realistic starting goal. It would be overwhelming to take a duty to care about
the lives of others, but we can all do our part to find ways to care more about the lives of others.
The idea is to start small and add more over time.
To build on the points above when voting, I can do a better job of being a more informed
and more rational voter on a set of issues. Now that I can take more steps to find issues that are
hurting the people in my community, I have established an area to work within for voting. I can
then focus on a handful of issues instead of trying to understand all of them. I should then
research them heavily, looking at both sides, and searching out expert opinions on them. Trying
to find data on the source of the problem, parallel problems that have been solved in other places,
and understanding practical solutions are all of the considerations that I should take into account
when doing my research. Experts are going to have weighed in on all of these considerations in
almost any problem area that I choose. Assuming that I have taken care to find expert opinions
and data form research institutions that do not have an explicitly political goal like some news
outlets, I can then begin to start forming my opinion. Before deciding on a stance on an issue I
should then make sure to evaluate myself and where I might succumb to subconscious bias and
irrationality. Now that I am aware of where these pitfalls are, I can deliberately check them
before making a decision.

Checking my group bias is where my group loyalty chapter comes in handy. Now that I
have a set of issues that I care about because I care about my community and have researched
them to the best of my ability, I can look at my groups. If I am going to be making decisions on a
ballot that have the ability to infringe on the lives of others, I need to make sure that the decision
that I reach is as pure as it can be. By pure, I mean that it is as unbiased and as rational as
possible. When considering my group loyalties, I can start to list out the groups that I am a part
of and rank them for importance to my identity and where I might allow them to influence voting
decisions. After I have deliberately made myself aware of these, I can turn to the research that I
did and find what others are saying about the same topic that do not belong to my group. Then, I
can assess their arguments knowing that I am going to fight them harder because of my group
membership, so I will be aware to be open minded and accepting. I find that being aware of areas
of weakness and being deliberate about mediating against these effects can be helpful in making
progress toward overcoming those pitfalls.
There are gaps in some of my work and there is room to build upon these ideas as well.
Each of the three sections of my thesis has room for improvement that was not covered here. In
apathy there is a deeper consideration of the types of things that ought to motivate us. Within
voting, there are still questions over what a system of deference to experts would really look like
and how to make sure that it is accessible to everyone so that no one is disenfranchised by the
shift that this would cause in voting behavior. Group loyalties could be expanded to provide a
systematic way for us to check our motivated reasoning when it comes to our group membership
and social identity.
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